UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ GONZALEZ (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-10No. No. 19-50096, No. 19-50178

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the convictions of both defendants but vacated three supervised release conditions imposed on Ramirez-Gonzalez as unconstitutionally vague and remanded for modification of the judgment.

Two defendants were convicted of transporting undocumented immigrants in violation of federal law. On appeal, they challenged the validity of the prosecution, the wording of the indictment, jury instructions on accomplice liability, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting their convictions. The court rejected all these challenges, finding the prosecution was properly authorized, the indictment language did not prejudice the defendants, the jury instructions correctly applied the law, and sufficient evidence supported conviction under either principal or accomplice liability theories.

The court did find error, however, in three of the supervised release conditions imposed on one defendant. Those conditions had previously been found unconstitutionally vague in another case, and the court determined they should not have been imposed here.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Authority of Acting U.S. Attorney to prosecute defendants
Whether indictment language stating 'knowing and in reckless disregard' properly stated the scienter element
Adequacy of jury instructions on aiding and abetting liability under Rosemond v. United States
Sufficiency of evidence to convict defendants notwithstanding acquittal of co-defendant
Constitutional validity of imposed supervised release conditions

Procedural posture

Defendants appealed their convictions for alien transportation and challenged three supervised release conditions imposed on Ramirez-Gonzalez.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Defendants German Ramirez-Gonzalez and Mary Aragon (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal their convictions for transporting an illegal alien or aliens within the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II), and three supervised release conditions imposed on Ramirez-Gonzalez. We affirm, except as to the challenged supervised release conditions.

1. Because the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of California was validly appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 546(d), the United States had the legal authority to indict and prosecute Defendants. See CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying de novo review to questions of constitutional law). We need not consider the constitutionality of Acting Attorney General Whitakers appointment because, to be valid, “indictments need only be signed by ‘an attorney for the government.’ ” See United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2008)).

2. The Third Superseding Indictment did not prejudicially misstate the scienter element of the alien transportation statute when it charged that Defendants acted with “knowing and in reckless disregard” to violate federal immigration law. ER 1-2 (emphasis added). Defendants cannot show prejudice on plain error review because framing the indictment conjunctively to require both “knowing and in reckless disregard” worked to the Defendants’ advantage by making it harder for the government to prove its case. See United States v. Leos-Maldonado, 302 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[R]eview of an untimely objection to the sufficiency of the indictment is limited to the plain error test.”).

3. Applying plain error review, United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2015), the district courts jury instructions on aiding and abetting liability satisfied the rule announced in Rosemond v. United States that an accomplice must have advance knowledge of the crime so that he or she has the requisite intent to assist in its commission. 572 U.S. 65, 77-81, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014).

4. We review de novo the district courts denial of Defendants’ Rule 29 motions for judgments of acquittal. See United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2010). Having considered the evidence presented by the Government at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we agree that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Aragon not only aided and abetted co-Defendant Patara in the transportation, but also that she acted as a principal. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (providing standard for district courts to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction). We also agree that there was sufficient evidence to show that Ramirez-Gonzalez aided and abetted Patara in transporting Lopez, an undocumented passenger in Pataras car. Defendants can be convicted of aiding and abetting even though one alleged principal, co-Defendant Patara, was acquitted. As noted, the evidence sufficed to show that Aragon acted as a principal, and the government pressed that alternative theory at trial. Regardless of Pataras acquittal, inconsistent verdicts are not a ground for reversal in this case because the evidence sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that someone, whether Aragon or Patara, committed the underlying substantive crime. United States v. Martinez, 806 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1986).

5. The district court committed plain error by imposing Standard Supervised Release Conditions 4, 5, and 13 on Ramirez-Gonzalez. See United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying plain error review to supervised release conditions not challenged at sentencing). We previously held those conditions to be unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we vacate Standard Supervised Release Conditions 4, 5, and 13 for Ramirez-Gonzalez and remand to the district court with instructions to issue an amended judgment consistent with our decision in Evans. Id. at 1162-64.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED as to Standard Supervised Release Conditions 4, 5, and 13.