PAZ RODRIGUEZ v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-01No. No. 20-72640

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. The court upheld the immigration judge's determination that Paz-Rodriguez did not meet his burden of showing a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico.

Salvador Paz-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, challenged an immigration judge's finding that he lacked a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico that would entitle him to relief from removal. The court reviewed the immigration judge's decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court found that Paz-Rodriguez failed to establish either a reasonable possibility of persecution based on a protected ground or a reasonable possibility of torture with government involvement or acquiescence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether petitioner established reasonable fear of persecution on account of protected ground
Whether petitioner demonstrated particular social group membership
Whether petitioner showed reasonable possibility of torture by or with government acquiescence
Jurisdiction over claims raised for first time on appeal

Procedural posture

Paz-Rodriguez petitioned for review of an immigration judge's negative reasonable fear determination under the reinstated removal statute.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Salvador Paz-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an Immigration Judges (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico and thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review an IJs negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJs determination that Paz-Rodriguez failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in Mexico on account of a protected ground, including membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicants “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”); see also Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that “imputed wealthy Americans” returning to Mexico did not constitute a particular social group). We lack jurisdiction to consider the political opinion and family-based social group claims Paz-Rodriguez raises in the first instance in his opening brief. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJs determination that Paz-Rodriguez failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836-37 (no reasonable possibility of torture with government acquiescence).

We reject as unsupported by the record Paz-Rodriguezs contentions that the IJ violated his right to due process or otherwise erred in the handling of his case.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. The motions for a stay of removal are otherwise denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.