KELMAR v. Bank of America Corporation; et al., Defendants. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-01No. No. 20-55722

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the proposed complaint as properly within the scope of the pre-filing vexatious litigant order.

Cheryl Kelmar appealed a district court order that rejected her proposed complaint because it violated a pre-filing vexatious litigant order previously imposed against her. The appellate court reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in enforcing this restriction. Because the proposed complaint fell within the scope of the existing pre-filing order, the court found no abuse of discretion and upheld the district court's rejection.

Kelmar also raised a claim that the district judge should have recused himself from the case, but the appellate court found this argument without merit. The court did not address the substantive merits of Kelmar's underlying complaint or examine the vexatious litigant orders from other courts, as those matters fell outside the scope of the appeal.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether district court abused discretion in enforcing pre-filing vexatious litigant order
Whether judge should have recused himself
Scope of pre-filing restrictions on vexatious litigants

Procedural posture

Kelmar appealed pro se from a district court order rejecting her proposed complaint under a pre-filing vexatious litigant restriction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Cheryl Kelmar appeals pro se from the district courts order rejecting her proposed complaint under a pre-filing vexatious litigant order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Kelmars proposed complaint because the complaint was within the scope of the district courts pre-filing vexatious litigant order. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (“District courts have the inherent power to file restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants with abusive and lengthy histories of litigation. Such pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from filing further actions or papers unless he or she first meets certain requirements, such as obtaining leave of the court․” (internal citation omitted)).

We reject as without merit Kelmars contention that the district judge should have recused himself from this action.

We do not consider Kelmars contentions regarding the underlying merits of her proposed complaint or the vexatious litigant orders against her in the Central District of California and Santa Barbara County Superior Court because those issues are outside the scope of this appeal.