OPINION
The U.S. Marshals Service arrested Rudy Rivera in California on a warrant issued by the District of Nevada for marijuana-related charges. The next day, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of California ordered Riveras transfer “as soon as possible” to the District of Nevada for an arraignment and detention hearing. The Marshals transported Rivera to Nevada about a week later and housed him in a private prison run by CoreCivic. But instead of being brought promptly to court, Rivera spent 355 days in solitary confinement without a court appearance. During his detention, Rivera repeatedly told CoreCivic employees, the only individuals beyond fellow detainees with whom he had contact, that he had not been to court and did not have counsel. But CoreCivic employees neither informed the Marshals of Riveras plight nor took any other steps to remedy the situation. Rivera contends that CoreCivic employees dissuaded him from seeking outside help by telling him to “[j]ust sit there and wait,” and that the federal government “does what they want to” and will “get you when theyre going to come get you.” They also failed to inform him that he was in the custody of the Marshals and could reach out to the Marshals for assistance.
After Rivera finally sent a letter to the Federal Public Defenders Office, he was brought before a federal magistrate judge the very next business day.
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The court declared Riveras prolonged detention “extreme” and “egregious” and ordered his immediate release on a personal recognizance bond. The criminal charges against him were eventually dismissed with prejudice.
Rivera sued CoreCivic in federal court for Nevada torts related to his year-long detention without a court hearing. The district court granted CoreCivics summary judgment motion on the ground that CoreCivic did not cause Riveras prolonged detention. We reverse.
I. Background
A. U.S. Marshals Service Custody of Individuals Awaiting Federal Trial and Sentencing
The U.S. Marshals Service (“Marshals”) is responsible for maintaining custody of individuals detained pending trial or sentencing for federal criminal offenses. In fiscal year 2020, the Marshals received over 160,000 individuals into its custody and, on average, had custody over 62,000 individuals every day.
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Because the Marshals does not own or operate any detention facilities, it places those in its custody in facilities run by other entities.
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The Marshals detain the vast majority—around 85 percent—of those in its custody outside the federal system through approximately 1,200 contracts with state, local, and private facilities.
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B. CoreCivics Operation of Nevada Southern Detention Center
CoreCivic, formerly Corrections Corporation of America, operates private prisons, detention centers, and other correctional facilities throughout the United States. It manages an estimated 39 percent of the countrys private prison beds.
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At the end of 2020, the Marshals was the primary customer at eight of CoreCivics forty-seven facilities, and contracts with the Marshals accounted for 21 percent—$396.3 million—of CoreCivics 2020 revenue.
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The Marshals is the primary customer at Nevada Southern Detention Center (“NSDC”), a CoreCivic detention facility in Pahrump, Nevada that has capacity to detain around 1,000 individuals.
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While at NSDC, detainees remain in the legal custody of the Marshals, and CoreCivic has no authority to release them or take them to court absent instruction from the Marshals. The Marshals maintains a regular presence at NSDC, but detained individuals interact almost exclusively with CoreCivic employees who provide security, transportation, medical care, food services, and programming.
C. Riveras 355-day Detention at CoreCivics Detention Center
In November 2014, the United States indicted Rivera for marijuana-related offenses in the District of Nevada, and a court in the district issued a warrant for his arrest. The Marshals arrested Rivera in California on October 26, 2015, and, pursuant to a magistrate judges order, soon thereafter transferred him to the District of Nevada for arraignment and a detention hearing. The Marshals transferred Rivera to NSDC on November 4, 2015, just over a week after his arrest. CoreCivic placed Rivera in administrative segregation due to safety concerns based on his status as a gang dropout. Rivera then waited 355 days, until October 24, 2016, for his first hearing in the District of Nevada.
During his detention, Rivera repeatedly informed CoreCivic employees that he had not been to court and did not have counsel.
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In response to his statements, the employees told him to “[j]ust sit there and wait,” and that the federal government “does what they want to” and “[t]heyll get you when theyre going to come get you.” Rivera testified that CoreCivic employees did not tell him he was actually in the custody of the Marshals or that he could speak to a Marshals deputy at NSDC to address his concerns. According to Rivera, CoreCivic also failed to give him a detainee handbook, which referenced the Marshals, during his first seven months of detention.
Riveras interactions with CoreCivic employees led him to believe that his case was proceeding normally and there was no further action he could take to prompt a hearing. He therefore never requested contact information for an attorney, the Marshals, or the court to inform them of his situation.
Rivera wrote to the Federal Public Defenders Office as a year of detention approached to prove to his girlfriend that he had not been to court. The Public Defenders Office received Riveras letter on Friday afternoon, October 21, 2016 and called the Marshals immediately. The Marshals brought Rivera to court the next business day, Monday, October 24, 2016. A magistrate judge declared Riveras prolonged detention “extreme” and “egregious” and released him from the building on a personal recognizance bond. The court later dismissed all charges against Rivera with prejudice.
D. Procedural History
After his release, Rivera sued CoreCivic and CoreCivic employees in federal court for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nevada law.
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The district court granted CoreCivics summary judgment motion as to all claims and entered judgment in CoreCivics favor, finding that CoreCivic did not cause Riveras prolonged detention because it could not schedule a hearing for Rivera or release him. Rivera appeals. Because a reasonable jury could find that CoreCivic caused Riveras prolonged detention by failing to notify the Marshals of his continued detention without a hearing and by discouraging and preventing him from seeking outside help, we reverse and remand.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district courts grant of summary judgment de novo. Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). “Viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact remain and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. We will reverse a grant of summary judgment “[i]f a rational trier of fact could resolve a genuine issue of material fact in the nonmoving partys favor.” Id.
III. Discussion
A. A Jury Could Reasonably Find that CoreCivics Actions Caused Riveras Prolonged Detention.
Causation is an element of Riveras claims under Nevada law for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Therefore, to survive summary judgment, Rivera must show that a rational jury could find that CoreCivics actions caused his prolonged detention. Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1083. Put another way, a jury must be able to find that CoreCivics actions contributed to a delay in his initial hearing in the District of Nevada. Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 99 Nev. 548, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 & n.3 (1983) (per curiam) (a defendant who fails to take a lawfully arrested person to court “within a reasonable time or without unnecessary delay” can be liable for false imprisonment if they “improperly contributed to the delay”). Summary judgment is often improper on the issue of causation because it is “classically [a] question[ ] of fact.” Klasch v. Walgreen Co., 127 Nev. 832, 264 P.3d 1155, 1161 (2011) (en banc).
Here, CoreCivic argues that the Marshals solely caused Riveras detention. Rivera counters that CoreCivic also caused his prolonged detention because, if CoreCivic had notified the Marshals of his continued detention or had not misled him to believe that there was nothing he could do to remedy his situation, he would have secured a hearing long before 355 days elapsed. We conclude that a rational jury could reasonably find in Riveras favor.
In his deposition, Rivera testified that he regularly informed CoreCivic employees that he had not been to court, but CoreCivic never shared this information with the Marshals.
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Instead, the employees instructed him “just to wait.” Riveras case manager told him that “the federal government does what they want to,” and “[t]heyll get you when theyre going to come get you.” CoreCivic employees never informed him he was in Marshals custody or that there was a Marshal onsite with whom he could have spoken. CoreCivic also failed to provide him with a detainee handbook, which referenced the Marshals, during his first seven months at NSDC.
Rivera claims that CoreCivics statements dissuaded him from seeking outside help. When asked why he did not request the Public Defenders Offices contact information earlier, Rivera responded, “I didnt know. I was told just to wait; so I didnt assume. Im just waiting for the feds to come pick me up and take me to court. ․ Im being told by staff thats paid to ․ take care of these inmates ․ not to do anything. Just sit there and wait.”
Rivera also explained that CoreCivics failure to inform him about the Marshalss connection to NSDC prevented him from understanding that he could contact the Marshals for help. He testified, “I assumed its CoreCivic I would have to reach out to. I wasnt told it was a United States Marshals [sic] facility.” He also explained, “[I]f I would have known that the staff wasnt responsible for me as they claimed, that it was up to me to go to court, then I would have definitely done something.”
On these facts, a rational jury could find that CoreCivics failure to notify the Marshals of Riveras plight prolonged Riveras detention because, had CoreCivic informed the Marshals, it almost certainly would have promptly taken Rivera to court. Indeed, when contacted by the Public Defenders Office, the Marshals immediately acted to bring Rivera before a judge the very next business day.
A rational jury could also find that CoreCivics actions served to dissuade Rivera from seeking outside help by implying there was nothing anyone but the federal government could do to prompt a hearing and by failing to make clear that he could contact the Marshals with his concerns.
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As CoreCivic concedes in its briefing, had “Rivera himself ․ simply made an effort to reach out to anyone[, ․] he would have been released from NSDC long before October 24, 2016.”
CoreCivic argues, and the district court agreed, that our decision in Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999), dictates a different outcome. Brooks, however, is readily distinguishable.
In Brooks, Alameda County, California (“the County”) held a federal detainee on behalf of the Marshals for twelve days without arraignment. Id. at 1246. After his release, the detainee sued the County for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California false imprisonment, and other violations of California law. Id. at 1246–47. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1247. We affirmed, explaining that “[t]he County was without authority either to bring Brooks before a federal magistrate judge itself, because it cannot act for the United States, or to release him, because it cannot ignore the state statute” that prevented it from releasing a federal detainee “until he or she is discharged according to law.” Id. at 1248. We held that the County was “not a legal cause of Brooks’ injury” because it “could not have altered what happened to [him].” Id.
CoreCivic is correct that, like the County in Brooks, it had no authority to bring Rivera before a judge or release him.
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But, contrary to CoreCivics argument, it does not automatically follow that the Marshals alone caused Riveras prolonged detention and CoreCivic cannot be held liable for contributing to a prolonged detention under any circumstances.
Construing the evidence in Riveras favor, which we must at this stage of the litigation, a jury could reasonably find that CoreCivics actions prolonged Riveras detention. Even though CoreCivic could not schedule a hearing for Rivera, it could have almost certainly prompted a hearing by notifying the Marshals of Riveras plight. As noted above, when the Public Defenders Office informed the Marshals of Riveras detention, the Marshals brought Rivera to court the next business day. We have no reason to believe the Marshals would have responded differently had CoreCivic, and not the Public Defenders Office, informed them of Riveras prolonged detention.
The length of Riveras detention makes this case less like Brooks and more like Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1992). In Oviatt, Multnomah County, Oregon detained a man for 114 days without arraignment in his state-court proceedings. Id. at 1472. We upheld a jury award in Oviatts subsequent § 1983 claim, reasoning that if Multnomah County had better tracking systems, it is unlikely Oviatt would have suffered such a lengthy detention. Id. at 1478–79. Like in Oviatt, and as described above, “it is unlikely that [Rivera] would have spent [355] days in jail without an arraignment, a bail hearing, or a trial” had CoreCivic informed the Marshals of his continued detention. Id.
Brooks’s procedural posture also distinguishes it from this case. Because Brooks was an appeal of a motion to dismiss, the factual record before us was limited. See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Generally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is limited to the contents of the complaint.”). Unlike the facts here, there was no indication in Brooks that the County was aware Brooks had not been to court or misled or prevented him from seeking outside help.
In sum, we find that Rivera presented sufficient evidence to overcome CoreCivics summary judgment motion as to causation for each of his claims. A rational jury could find that, in failing to notify the Marshals of Riveras detention and in dissuading and preventing Rivera from seeking other help, CoreCivic was a cause of Riveras pre-hearing detention as required to establish claims for false imprisonment,
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negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. A Jury Could Reasonably Find that CoreCivic Breached a Duty to Rivera.
To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Turner v. Mandalay Sport Ent., LLC, 124 Nev. 213, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175 (2008) (en banc). The district court held that, because CoreCivic “could not act on behalf of the United States or contravene the Marshals Services decision to incarcerate [him,]” it neither had nor breached any duty to Rivera. We find that Rivera established a triable issue as to duty and breach.
CoreCivic does not dispute that it assumed a duty of reasonable care over Rivera when it took him into its physical custody. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) & cmt. e (1965). Rather, it argues that it did not breach any duty it might have had because “no reasonable jury could find that NSDC staff knew or had reason to know that [Rivera] needed help ․ or that the staff acted unreasonably to delay that help.” CoreCivics argument is unconvincing.
Riveras evidence, if credited by the jury, could easily establish that CoreCivic failed to exercise reasonable care when its employees did not inform the Marshals of Riveras prolonged detention, told Rivera that he just needed to wait, implied that nothing could be done to trigger a hearing, and failed to inform him that he was in the legal custody of the Marshals and that he could request to speak with a Marshals deputy who was regularly at NSDC. See Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 168 P.3d 1055, 1059, 1065–66 (2007) (en banc) (finding a triable issue as to whether prison officials breached a duty to an incarcerated person with a permanent spinal cord injury and brain damage when they released him to a residence that had no wheelchair ramp, hospital bed, or other medical supplies). We therefore find that Rivera has established triable issues as to each element of his negligence claim.
C. A Jury Could Reasonably Find CoreCivics Actions Extreme or Outrageous.
To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or reckless disregard for the causing of emotional distress; (3) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) causation. Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 995 P.2d 1023, 1025 (2000). The district court found that because CoreCivic did not cause Riveras prolonged incarceration, its conduct was not extreme and outrageous. A rational jury, however, could find that CoreCivics conduct, which resulted in prolonged detention of nearly a year without a court appearance, was extreme and outrageous.
CoreCivic deprived Rivera of freedom from incarceration, “the paradigmatic liberty interest under the due process clause.” Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474. “[F]reedom from incarceration is a vital liberty interest for those who have not been criminally convicted. It is a basic assumption with which we guide our lives: the state may not incarcerate any individual randomly and without specific protective procedures.” Id. at 1476. And the Due Process Clause is not the only constitutional provision that protects an individuals right to be free from incarceration; the Sixth Amendments speedy trial guarantee is “designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial ․ and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982).
Given the nature of Riveras liberty interest, the egregious length of his detention without arraignment, the ease with which CoreCivic could have corrected the problem, and the callousness of its disregard, a rational jury could find that CoreCivic acted extremely or outrageously. See Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 114 Nev. 1, 953 P.2d 24, 26 (1998) (per curiam) (“[E]xtreme and outrageous conduct is that which is ‘outside all possible bounds of decency’ and is regarded as ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” (quoting California Book of Approved Jury Instructions 12.74)). The record therefore shows that Rivera has established a triable issue as to each element of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Because we find that Riveras claims for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress each survive summary judgment, the case is
REVERSED and REMANDED.
FOOTNOTES
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. We take judicial notice of Riveras arraignment transcript, which he submitted with his appellate briefing. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, which may include court records available through PACER.”).
2
. U.S. Marshals Serv., FY 2020 Annual Report 47–48 (2021), https://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/annual-report-2020.pdf.
3
. U.S. Marshals Serv., Prisoner Operations 2 (2021), https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/prisoner_ops.pdf.
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. Id. at 1. The Federal Bureau of Prisons detains the remaining individuals. Id.
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. CoreCivic, 2020 Annual Report, Form 10-K 14 (2021), http://ir.corecivic.com/static-files/2d02c7d4-786a-4a48-8c1b-3e2522c511f3.
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. Id. at 7, 15.
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. Id. at 22.
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. Because this is an appeal of a summary judgment order, we “[v]iew[ ] the evidence and draw[ ] all inferences in the light most favorable to [Rivera].” Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). We therefore recount the facts as Rivera presented them.
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. Rivera also asserted a cause of action against CoreCivic for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but the district court concluded he failed to state a claim. He also sued several government defendants for constitutional violations, but the court dismissed those claims pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
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. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dept of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 110 P.3d 30, 48 (2005) (en banc) (per curiam) (false imprisonment), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008) (en banc); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Ent., LLC, 124 Nev. 213, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175 (2008) (en banc) (negligence); Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 995 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Nev. 2000) (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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. CoreCivic incorrectly claims that Rivera “fails to point to any testimony” that shows its employees were aware of his prolonged detention. To the contrary, Rivera testified that he repeatedly informed his case manager that he had not been to court, did not have an attorney, and did not know the status of his case. He also testified that “[e]very single officer that worked in [administrative segregation] for that year knows that I didnt go to court. Every single officer.” This testimony, if accepted by the jury, is more than sufficient to find that CoreCivic was aware of Riveras prolonged detention. Because a rational jury could find that CoreCivic caused Riveras prolonged detention by failing to notify the Marshals of his detention and in dissuading and preventing him from seeking other help, we need not determine whether Rivera established a triable issue as to causation based on CoreCivics failure to track whether Rivera had gone to court.
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. To be sure, it was not Riveras responsibility to request a hearing. However, because contacting the Marshals, an attorney, or the court would likely have prompted a hearing, a rational jury could find that CoreCivics statements and omissions lengthened Riveras pre-arraignment detention.
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. As the district court found, the Marshals retained legal custody over Rivera, see 18 U.S.C. § 4086; 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(k), and CoreCivics contract with the Marshals prevented CoreCivic from releasing him. Rivera argues that Wormley v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2009), establishes that CoreCivic could have released him. We disagree. First, CoreCivics NSDC contract does not contain a provision allowing CoreCivic to request detainee transfer as did the contract in Wormley. See id. at 44. Even if it did, the Wormley court explained that the contract provision “does not resolve the issue of whether defendants could have remedied plaintiffs situation” by releasing her but, rather, “render[s] plausible plaintiffs claims that defendants could have—and perhaps should have—informed DOC of plaintiffs inquiries regarding her incarceration, an act which possibly could have resulted in her release.” Id.
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. Rivera has established a triable issue as to each element of his false imprisonment claim, as CoreCivic challenges only the causation element. We therefore reverse as to that claim. See Jordan, 110 P.3d at 48 (“[A]n actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment ‘if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.’ ” (quoting Hernandez v. City of Reno, 97 Nev. 429, 634 P.2d 668, 671 (1981))).
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge: