MEMORANDUM *
Petitioners Ismelda Soriano Ruiz and her two minor children, natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We deny the petition.
1. Our precedent forecloses the argument that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction because the notices to appear did not specify the time and place of the hearing. “[T]he jurisdiction of the immigration court vests upon the filing of an NTA, even one that does not at that time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing.” United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 986 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Soriano Ruizs placement in standard removal proceedings without a credible-fear interview did not violate due process. “The government has discretion to place noncitizens in standard removal proceedings even if the expedited removal statute could be applied to them.” Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2019). And because Soriano Ruiz was “given a full and fair opportunity to be represented by counsel, to prepare an application for ․ relief, and to present testimony and other evidence in support of the application,” she received all that due process requires. Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2007). In any event, Soriano Ruiz cannot show prejudice. See id. at 926. If Soriano Ruiz had been given a credible-fear interview and found credible, she would have received “full consideration” of her claims in a standard removal hearing—the very process she received from the outset by bypassing the agencys expedited removal procedures. See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964–66, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020) (citation omitted).
Nor did the immigration judge lack jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 208.2. Section 208.2(b) provides that an immigration judge “shall have exclusive jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by an alien who has been served a ․ Form I-862, Notice to Appear,” with which Soriano Ruiz and her children were served.
3. Soriano Ruiz claims that the immigration judge abused his discretion by denying a continuance to consolidate her and her childrens cases with that of her husband, Francis Rivera. In assessing whether the immigration judge abused his discretion, we consider “(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrants conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.” Hui Ran Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Soriano Ruiz has not explained why her case should have been consolidated with Riveras. As the immigration judge noted, the facts underlying their claims for relief are entirely different. Rivera came to the United States fleeing gang violence. By contrast, Soriano Ruiz and her children fled Guatemala years later to escape domestic violence perpetrated by Soriano Ruizs then domestic partner, Alonzo; when they left, they did not even know that Rivera was in the United States. Soriano Ruiz did not marry Rivera until she had been living in the United States for almost two years—almost a year after she filed her Form I-589. In any event, although the immigration judge declined to formally consolidate Soriano Ruizs case with Riveras, their hearings were held together. We also note that Soriano Ruiz and her childrens cases had previously been continued at their request. The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in denying another continuance. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011).
4. Finally, Soriano Ruiz argues that the agencys adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. An immigration judge may enter an adverse credibility determination based on the totality of the circumstances, including inconsistencies in an applicants testimony, so long as he “provide[s] specific and cogent reasons” based on “specific instances in the record” and provides an opportunity for the applicant to explain the inconsistency. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). An inconsistency need not “go to the heart” of a petitioners claim, but such inconsistencies are “of great weight.” Id. at 1043, 1047.
The Board identified multiple inconsistencies in affirming the immigration judges adverse credibility determination. In her declaration, Soriano Ruiz claimed that Alonzo did not physically abuse her while she was pregnant, but at her hearing, she testified that he did. When asked about the discrepancy, Soriano Ruiz said she was “nervous” and “didnt know what [she] said.” After further attempts to clarify the discrepancy, she was unable to provide an explanation. Soriano Ruiz also admitted that she lied when she testified that she received no assistance in coming to the United States. And when she was asked about an inconsistency between her declaration and her testimony concerning who knew of her abuse, Soriano Ruiz admitted that her testimony “wasnt true.” These inconsistencies constitute substantial evidence for the agencys adverse credibility determination.
Soriano Ruiz argues that the agency did not adequately consider psychological evidence that could have explained her inconsistent testimony. But in light of her testimony that she was “feeling better” after regular visits with a psychologist, the Boards determination that this evidence could not “overcome the Immigration Judges credibility concerns in the totality of the circumstances” is supported by substantial evidence.
PETITION DENIED.