ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Mr. Greg Paul Revere Sanchez appeals from the district courts dismissal of his civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1
The district court dismissed Mr. Sanchezs § 1983 action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), after he failed to comply with a court order directing him to file a second amended complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district courts dismissal of Mr. Sanchezs § 1983 action.
I
Mr. Sanchez is incarcerated in a Utah state prison. In January 2018, he filed a § 1983 complaint pro se in Utah federal district court. His complaint listed more than two dozen defendants; most were Utah state judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officials, or correctional officers. Mr. Sanchezs complaint contained a scattershot of alleged civil rights violations. None were pleaded with much precision. But the vast majority of his allegations related, in one way or another, to Mr. Sanchezs overarching claim that he was fraudulently and maliciously prosecuted and imprisoned.
In May 2019, the district court ordered Mr. Sanchez to file an amended complaint to cure several deficiencies in his complaint. The court specifically cited twelve aspects of Mr. Sanchezs complaint that were deficient or possibly deficient. Most of the alleged deficiencies related to improperly pleading certain claims and improperly naming defendants without considering whether they were immune. The court also provided guidance on how to cure the deficiencies.
One month later, Mr. Sanchez filed an amended complaint. This time, Mr. Sanchez listed only five defendants: two officers from the Beaver County, Utah, sheriffs office and three officers from the Beaver County jail. The amended complaint reiterated many of Mr. Sanchezs initial broad allegations about the circumstances leading to his ostensibly wrongful imprisonment. However, against the named defendants, Mr. Sanchez somewhat more precisely alleged that the defendants fraudulently charged him with various crimes and harassed him in the county jail.
In April 2020, the district court ordered Mr. Sanchez to cure deficiencies in his amended complaint. The court identified twelve deficiencies in the amended complaint. Most deficiencies related again to improperly pleading certain claims and naming certain defendants. The court provided guidance on how to cure the deficiencies and ordered Mr. Sanchez to file a second amended complaint within thirty days.
Mr. Sanchez never filed a second amended complaint. On June 18, 2020, the district court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b). The court technically dismissed the action without prejudice. However, the court noted that the statute of limitations might have expired on some of Mr. Sanchezs claims. Therefore, the court assumed that the statute of limitations had run on all of his claims and that a dismissal of the action was effectively with prejudice.
The court therefore looked to our decision in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992), to determine whether a dismissal of Mr. Sanchezs action was appropriate. In Ehrenhaus, we directed courts to consider five factors when dismissing an action with prejudice: (1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant, (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process, (3) the litigants culpability, (4) whether the court warned the noncomplying litigant that dismissal of the action was a likely sanction, and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. See Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921. The district court expressly weighed each Ehrenhaus factor and concluded that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. Mr. Sanchez has brought this timely appeal.
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with ․ a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). “Although the language of Rule 41(b) requires that the defendant file a motion to dismiss, the Rule has long been interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiffs failure to prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or courts orders.” Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003).
When a district court dismisses an action sua sponte pursuant to Rule 41(b), we review for an abuse of discretion. See Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1060–61 (10th Cir. 2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs where a decision is premised on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling.” Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1223 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting N.M. Dept of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dept of Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2017)).
Mr. Sanchez fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his action. Before doing so, the court carefully considered all five of the Ehrenhaus factors. Although the Ehrenhaus factors “do not constitute a rigid test,” Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921, they are a “non-exclusive list of sometimes-helpful ‘criteria’ or guide posts the district court may wish to ‘consider’ in the exercise of what must always remain a discretionary function,” Lee v. Max Intl, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1323 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921).
On the first factor, the court concluded that Mr. Sanchezs “neglect does not overtly prejudice Defendants, except that, in general, passage of time can weaken evidentiary support for a position.” R. at 142 (Mem. Decision & Dismissal Order, filed June 18, 2020). On the second factor, the court determined that Mr. Sanchezs failure to comply “caused the Court and staff to spend unnecessary time and effort” and thereby “increased the workload of the Court and t[ook] its attention away from other matters in which parties have met their obligations and deserve prompt resolution of their issues.” Id. at 143. The court noted, regarding the third factor, that Mr. Sanchez previously “showed ability to file complaints and respond to Court orders,” and therefore presumably “kn[ew] to obey” the courts second order to cure deficiencies in his amended complaint. Id. at 144. On the fourth factor, the court insisted that “[t]here can be no mistaking [its] intentions,” given that it explicitly stated in its second order to cure deficiencies that it would dismiss the action if Mr. Sanchez failed to timely comply. Id. at 145. Finally, on the fifth factor, the court concluded that “no sanction less than dismissal would work here”—specifically, because Mr. Sanchez “has neglected this case so thoroughly that the Court doubts monetary or evidentiary sanctions would be effective (even if such sanctions could be motivating for an indigent, pro se prisoner).” Id. at 147.
Mr. Sanchez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed his action. In fact, Mr. Sanchez has not even attempted to make an abuse-of-discretion argument. Instead, his brief merely restates the various allegations of his underlying § 1983 claims as raised in his first and amended complaints. This showing provides no basis for us to reverse the district courts decision.
After all, “[t]he first task of an appellant is to explain to us why the district courts decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (“It is insufficient merely to state in ones brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for the appeal.” (quoting Am. Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992))). Mr. Sanchezs brief certainly spins a “tale of apparent injustice.” Nixon, 784 F.3d at 1366. But it “utterly fails ․ to explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision.” Id.
Even construing Mr. Sanchezs briefing liberally, we cannot find any argument therein on why the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his action pursuant to Rule 41(b). Because Mr. Sanchez “has failed to present any argument or authority in support of this particular ․ claim, we decline to further consider it on appeal.” EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1050 n.18 (10th Cir. 2011).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courts dismissal of Mr. Sanchezs § 1983 action.
2
FOOTNOTES
1
. Because Mr. Sanchez appears pro se, we construe his filings liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. See United States v. Parker, 720 F.3d 781, 784 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013).
2
. Mr. Sanchez has filed two motions. The first is a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The second motion is a request for appointment of counsel to assist with his appeal. We summarily deny the IFP motion; as evident from our previous discussion, Mr. Sanchez has failed to “show ․ the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). Consequently, Mr. Sanchez is obligated to pay immediately the outstanding balance of the filing fee. Furthermore, we deny the appointed-counsel motion as moot.
Jerome A. Holmes Circuit Judge