UNITED STATES v. MUMPHREY (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-05-26No. No. 20-10251

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Mumphrey's motion for sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act, holding that his Hobbs Act robbery conviction does not qualify for relief because the statutory penalties for that offense were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.

Charles Bo Mumphrey sought a reduction of his sentence for Hobbs Act robbery under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Mumphrey argued that his career offender classification relied partly on a prior crack cocaine conviction, and that this should qualify him for relief under the First Step Act. The court examined the statutory language of the First Step Act and determined that section 404 specifically applies only to offenses whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Because Mumphrey's Hobbs Act robbery conviction did not fall within this category, no provision of the First Step Act authorized a sentence reduction in his case.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Scope of sentence reduction authority under the First Step Act of 2018
Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies for relief under section 404
Connection between Fair Sentencing Act modifications and First Step Act eligibility

Procedural posture

Mumphrey appealed pro se from the district court's order denying his motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Charles Bo Mumphrey appeals pro se from the district courts order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Mumphrey contends that the First Step Act allows for a reduction of the sentence imposed in connection with his conviction for interfering with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, because his career offender designation was based, in part, on a prior crack cocaine conviction. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). No provision of the Act authorizes a sentence reduction in this case. See First Step Act §§ 401-04. Contrary to his contention, section 404 does not apply to Mumphrey because his current Hobbs Act robbery conviction is not an offense for which “the statutory penalties ․ were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id., § 404(a); United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing scope of Fair Sentencing Act).

Mumphreys motions for sentence reduction and relief under the First Step Act are denied.

AFFIRMED.