MEMORANDUM **
Francis Steffan Hayes appeals pro se from the district courts order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayess motion for a preliminary injunction because Hayes failed to establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. See id. (plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in the public interest); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905) (holding the Supreme Court “has distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine law and health laws of every description” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
An appeal ordinarily “does not lie from the denial of an application for a temporary restraining order” because such appeals are considered “premature.” Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Intl, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989). A district courts order denying an application for a TRO is reviewable on appeal only if the order is tantamount to the denial of a preliminary injunction. See id. Because the district courts order denying the TRO did not amount to the denial of a preliminary injunction, we do not have jurisdiction over that portion of Hayess appeal.
We reject as meritless Hayess claims that the district judge was biased against him. His motion in the district court seeking her recusal is outside of the scope of this appeal.
Hayess motions for emergency interlocutory relief (Docket Entry Nos. 13 and 14) are denied.
AFFIRMED.