UNITED STATES v. COOPER (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.2021-02-11No. No. 20-1578

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Cooper's motion for sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act, finding the defendant eligible for relief but that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the sentence.

Alvin Lee Cooper pleaded guilty in 2010 to drug trafficking and firearm offenses and received a 250-month sentence in 2012. After Congress enacted the First Step Act in 2018, which retroactively reduced penalties for cocaine base offenses, Cooper sought a sentence reduction in 2019. The district court denied his motion, questioning his eligibility but also stating it would deny relief regardless. On appeal, Cooper argued the district court failed to adequately review his request on the merits.

The appellate court addressed two statutory requirements for First Step Act relief: eligibility and the district court's discretionary decision to grant or deny reduction. The court found Cooper eligible under the plain language of the statute because his offense occurred before the August 2010 deadline and his sentence had not previously been adjusted under the Fair Sentencing Act. However, the court determined remand was futile since the district court had indicated it would deny relief even if eligibility were established. Regarding the discretionary denial, the court found the district court provided a reasoned basis for its decision—that the First Step Act's reduced mandatory minimum had no actual effect on Cooper's original sentence calculation, making sentence reduction inappropriate.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Eligibility for sentence reduction under the First Step Act's retroactive cocaine offense provisions
Whether a district court must conduct substantive analysis of statutory sentencing factors when exercising discretion to grant or deny First Step Act relief
Whether a district court's reasoning that amended penalties had no effect on the original sentence calculation constitutes a reasoned basis for denying reduction

Procedural posture

Cooper appealed the district court's denial of his motion for sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

[Unpublished]

Alvin Lee Cooper appeals the district courts

denial of his motion for sentence reduction pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). We affirm.

On July 26, 2010, Cooper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, and a detectable amount of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), (B), and (D). He also pleaded guilty to possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Cooper had an advisory sentencing Guidelines range for the conspiracy count of 360 months’ to life imprisonment with a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months for the firearm conviction. At sentencing in February 2012, the district court sentenced Cooper to a total of 250 months’ imprisonment after considering the Guidelines and the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, “which made retroactive the lower penalties for cocaine base offenses established by the Fair Sentencing Act [of 2010].” United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 2019). In 2019, Cooper moved for a reduction of his sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act, the denial of which, as set forth above, gave rise to this appeal.

Determining whether to grant a motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 involves two steps. McDonald, 944 F.3d at 772. “First, the [district] court must decide whether the defendant is eligible for relief under § 404. Second, if the defendant is eligible, the [district] court must decide, in its discretion, whether to grant a reduction.” Id. We review the district courts determination as to Coopers eligibility under the First Step Act de novo and its decision whether to grant or deny a reduction for abuse of discretion. Id. at 771.

We turn first to Coopers eligibility. The district court “question[ed] whether the defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act because he was not sentenced prior to the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.” D. Ct. Order of March 6, 2020. Cooper argues remand is necessary because the district court failed to make a definitive eligibility determination. Under the plain text of the statute, Cooper is eligible for First Step Act relief because his covered offense was “committed before August 3, 2010,” § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222, and his sentence was not “previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act,” § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222. As in United States v. Howard, 962 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2020), however, remand here “would be an exercise in futility,” id. at 1015, because the district court stated that even if Cooper were eligible, “the court would decline to grant the defendant any relief,” D. Ct. Order of March 6, 2020.

We therefore turn to the district courts discretionary decision to deny a reduction in sentence. Cooper argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a complete review of his Section 404 motion on the merits because the order does not give any indication that the district court considered his arguments in favor of reduction. To conduct a “complete review” under Section 404, a district court must consider the arguments presented in the defendants motion and have a reasoned basis for its decision. United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2020). Our review consists of determining whether the record shows that the district court “has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Booker, 974 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)).

The record shows that the district court conducted a complete review of Coopers Section 404 motion here. In declining to grant Cooper relief, the district court reasoned that, although the First Step Act reduced the mandatory minimum term of incarceration for Coopers conspiracy count, “the mandatory minimum had no effect on [Coopers] sentence.” D. Ct. Order of March 6, 2020. It is clear from the district courts order that it declined to grant Cooper relief because the considerations that went into Coopers initial sentence were unaffected by the First Step Act. The district court is not required to analyze the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when exercising its discretion to grant or deny relief under the First Step Act. Moore, 963 F.3d at 727–28. Nor is the district court required to respond to every argument the defendant makes. United States v. Banks, 960 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2020). That is particularly true, when, as here, the Section 404 motion is reviewed by the same court that imposed the original sentence. Howard, 962 F.3d at 1015 (“The district court was ․ uniquely positioned to consider the many factors necessary in exercising its ultimate discretion.”).

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

. Cooper was sentenced to 215 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 35 months’ imprisonment on the firearm conviction.

PER CURIAM.