MEMORANDUM **
David Roland Hinkson appeals pro se from the district courts orders denying his motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Hinkson contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for compassionate release. He argues that his age and chronic medical conditions, his desire to provide hospice care for his parents, and the illegality of his sentence establish “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warranting relief.
The district court did not abuse its discretion.
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The record reflects that the district court considered Hinksons medical records and the arguments raised in both of his motions for compassionate release, but concluded that a reduced sentence was not appropriate in light of Hinksons serious underlying convictions, his lack of remorse, his poor behavior while in custody, and his ongoing dangerousness. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (district court must consider the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors when reviewing a motion for compassionate release); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). Moreover, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hinkson remained a danger to the community. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.”). We further find unpersuasive Hinksons other allegations of error by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. The denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). We assume for purposes of this appeal the governments undisputed assertion that the abuse of discretion standard also applies to denials under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).