MEMORANDUM **
Tomas Alvarado appeals pro se from the district courts order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Alvarado contends that he is entitled to compassionate release because (1) his age and various medical conditions increase his risk of severe illness or death should he contract COVID-19; (2) he has taken advantage of rehabilitative programs and not had any disciplinary infractions while in prison; and (3) he has a “solid release plan.” The district court did not abuse its discretion.
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The record reflects that the district court considered Alvarados medical conditions, age, and mitigating arguments. However, the court reasonably determined that relief was unwarranted in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (district court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors on a motion for compassionate release); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). Moreover, contrary to Alvarados argument, the district court did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.”).
We do not reach Alvarados remaining arguments, which are beyond the scope of a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. The denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). We accept for purposes of this appeal the governments undisputed assertion that the abuse of discretion standard also applies to denials under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).