MEMORANDUM **
Tamble Taylor appeals the district courts order granting summary judgment in favor of Lowes Corporation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
Lowes is entitled to summary judgment on Taylors claims that Lowes discriminated against him on the basis of race and age under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2), in terminating his employment. Even assuming Taylor established a prima facie case of discrimination, Lowes proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him: he committed a Class A violation of company policy. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000). Taylor has not pointed to “specific and substantial” circumstantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that this proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).
Lowes is entitled to summary judgment on Taylors claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (WDVPP). See Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 184 Wash.2d 268, 358 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). Taylor stated in his deposition that he did not make a complaint to Lowes regarding its failure to interview him for a delivery manager position; nor did he complain that this failure was due to discrimination on the basis of race or age. Accordingly, even assuming the WDVPP claim is not waived, Taylor failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that his making a report of discrimination was a significant factor in Lowes decision to terminate him. See Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 191 Wash.2d 712, 425 P.3d 837, 844 (2018).
Lowes is entitled to summary judgment on Taylors race and age discrimination claim under Title VII, the ADEA, and the WLAD, concerning Lowes decision not to hire him as a delivery manager. Even assuming Taylor included this claim in his federal complaint and did not waive it, Taylors Title VII and ADEA claims are unexhausted, because Taylor did not mention these claims in his Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) complaint, and thus did not mention them in his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint, Sanchez v. Pac. Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998), which was necessary for purposes of exhaustion, B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Feb. 20, 2002); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Any WLAD claim was untimely, because Taylor filed his federal complaint in August 2018, more than three years after Lowes failed to interview him for the delivery manager position in July 2015. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).
Lowes is entitled to summary judgment on Taylors retaliation claim because, even assuming Taylor included this claim in his federal complaint, Taylor failed to raise it in his WSHRC complaint, and thus failed to exhaust it. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C.§ 626(d)(1); Sanchez, 147 F.3d at 1099.
The remaining claims raised in Taylors opening brief on appeal were not raised to the district court and rely on evidence that was not before the district court. We dismiss these waived claims.
1
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
2
FOOTNOTES
1
. We remind Taylors counsel that, “save in unusual circumstances, we consider only the district court record on appeal.” Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up); see also Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
2
. Taylors Request for the Court to Take Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 19, is GRANTED.