SILVA v. MEDIC AMBULANCE SERVICE INC (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-05-04No. No. 20-16153

Summary · law.co

Holding. Reversed and remanded. Silva's state-law claims alleging violation of California Labor Code section 226.7 are not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act because they do not depend on interpreting the collective bargaining agreement but rather on a purely factual inquiry about whether the employer required on-call time during rest periods.

Meghan Silva, an ambulance technician, sued her former employer Medic Ambulance Service for allegedly violating California labor law by requiring her to remain on call during rest periods. Medic removed the case to federal court, arguing that Silva's claims were preempted by federal labor law governing collective bargaining agreements and therefore presented a federal question. The district court denied Silva's motion to remand, finding that her claims depended substantially on interpreting the collective bargaining agreement that governed her employment.

The appellate court reversed, holding that Silva's claims were not preempted because they rested fundamentally on a violation of California Labor Code section 226.7, not on rights created by or requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Although the agreement might be relevant as evidence of whether the employer required on-call time during rest periods, determining that factual matter did not require construing the agreement's terms. Since Silva's claims were not preempted by federal law, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the removed case.

A concurring opinion notes that subsequent California legislation—the Emergency Ambulance Employee Safety and Preparedness Act—now legally requires emergency ambulance employees to remain on call throughout their work shifts, potentially rendering Silva's claim moot and eliminating any live case or controversy for appeal.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether state labor law claims are preempted by the LMRA when a collective bargaining agreement is relevant to the facts but not required to be interpreted
Standard for determining if a claim is 'substantially dependent on analysis of' a collective bargaining agreement
Federal removal jurisdiction over claims involving collective bargaining agreements

Procedural posture

Silva appealed the district court's denial of her motion to remand a removed action to state court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Meghan Silva sued her former employer, Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. (“Medic”), alleging that Medic violated California law by requiring her to remain on call during rest periods. Medic removed the suit to district court on the ground that the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, completely preempts at least one of Silvas claims and therefore her action presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Silva filed a motion to remand, arguing that her claims were not preempted by the LMRA and thus the district court lacked removal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Silvas claims are preempted because her claims “substantially depend on analysis of” provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that governed the terms of her employment with Medic. The district court later dismissed Silvas claims with prejudice.

Silva appeals the denial of her motion to remand. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse. We review de novo the district courts determination that a plaintiffs action is preempted by the LMRA. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).

A state law claim is preempted under the LMRA if it is “founded directly on rights created by [a] collective-bargaining agreement[ ]” or is “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” McCray v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 902 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “The plaintiffs claim is the touchstone” for this analysis, and we only evaluate the “claims legal character—whatever its merits—so as to ensure it is decided in the proper forum.” Dent v. Natl Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Silvas claims are not preempted by the LMRA because they rise or fall on her allegation that Medic violated California Labor Code section 226.7 by requiring her to remain on call during rest periods. See McCray, 902 F.3d at 1010–13. Consequently, the claimed right to relief is based on California law, not the CBA. See id. at 1010–11. Moreover, Silvas claims are not substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA because “resolution of [her] state-law claim[s] does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” See Dent, 902 F.3d at 1117 (citation omitted). Although the CBA may be relevant to whether Medic required Silva to remain on call during rest periods, as Medic suggests, this “purely factual inquiry” does not depend on interpretation of the CBAs provisions. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1072–73. Indeed, Silva can establish that Medic required her to remain on call during rest periods without resort to the CBAs provisions. See Dent, 902 F.3d at 1117–18 (explaining that a claim only depends on analysis of a CBA if interpretation of the CBA is required for plaintiff to prevail). Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Silvas claims are preempted by the LMRA.

Because Silvas claims are not preempted, the district court lacked removal jurisdiction. See McCray, 902 F.3d at 1009, 1014. Accordingly, we reverse the district courts denial of the motion to remand, and we remand with instructions to remand this action to the Superior Court of California, County of Solano.

We grant Medics motion to take judicial notice. Dkt. 22.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

The people of the State of California have enacted a statute making it clear that Plaintiff Meghan Silva (Silva) has no viable statutory claim. Therefore, there is no longer a case or controversy, and Silva lacks Article III standing to pursue this appeal. See Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. United States Dept of Interior, 824 F.3d 807, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that, under Article III, “we must dismiss a case if there is no longer a ․ live case[ ] or controvers[y]” because “an appellant can obtain [no] relief for [her] claim”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Silva, an ambulance technician, alleged in her complaint that her employer Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. failed to provide off-duty rest breaks as required by California Labor Code § 226.7 and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 4. However, the Emergency Ambulance Employee Safety and Preparedness Act (the Act), California Labor Code § 887(a), precludes a viable claim against her employer for remaining on call during rest breaks.

California Labor Code § 887(a) provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary:

(a) In order to maximize protection of public health and safety, emergency ambulance employees shall remain reachable by a portable communications device throughout the entirety of each work shift.

In short, the statute requires emergency ambulance employees to remain on call “throughout the entirety of each work shift.” Id. This requirement is the practice Silva challenged. And California Labor Code § 889 made this requirement retroactive.

The California Court of Appeal has made it clear that a claim such as the one made by Silva is not viable. In Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 5th 660, 667, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 767 (2020), the court concluded that a similar appeal was moot. The court explained that “the Act now requires on-call rest periods and expressly made this mandate retroactive.” Id. at 666, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 767 (citing California Labor Code § 889).

Absent an indication that the California Supreme Court would interpret this statute differently (and there is none), we are bound by the California Court of Appeals interpretation. See Skyline Wesleyan Church v. Cal. Dept of Managed Health Care, 968 F.3d 738, 752 (9th Cir. 2020), as amended (articulating that “[b]ecause the Court of Appeals decision ․ represents the ruling of the highest state court issued to date, and we have not seen any persuasive data that the California Supreme Court would reach different conclusions, we are bound by that decision to the extent its interpretation of California law is relevant”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because this interpretation of the Act renders Silvas claim moot, there is no longer a case or controversy pending before us. We should dismiss this appeal and not address the merits of the remand decision.

FOOTNOTES

. We need not reach Medics assertion that a change in California law has rendered this case moot given our determination that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Silvas claims. See Sinochem Intl Co. v. Malaysia Intl Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (stating federal courts have “leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits’ ” (citation omitted)).

Concurrence by Judge RAWLINSON