BRICE v. CALIFORNIA FACULTY ASSOCIATION (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-28No. No. 19-56164

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because public sector unions may assert a good-faith defense against claims for retrospective monetary damages under federal civil rights law for agency fees collected before the Supreme Court's Janus decision, where the union relied on then-binding precedent and state law.

William Brice filed a federal civil rights lawsuit as a class action challenging compulsory union fees paid to the California Faculty Association, claiming the fees violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case, and Brice appealed. The appellate court upheld the dismissal, finding that the union could rely on a good-faith defense to shield itself from liability for fees collected before the Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, which changed the law on agency fees in the public sector. Because the union was following what was then established legal precedent and valid state law when collecting the fees, it cannot be held liable for damages from that period.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a public sector union can assert good-faith defense to liability for agency fees collected before Janus
Scope of retrospective damages liability under § 1983 for union fee collection
Reliance on prior Supreme Court precedent as basis for good-faith defense

Procedural posture

Brice appealed the district court's dismissal of his putative class action complaint under Rule 12(c).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

William D. Brice appeals from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 putative class action alleging a First Amendment claim arising out of compulsory agency fees (also known as fair share fees) paid to the California Faculty Association. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district courts dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Brices action because a public sector union can, as a matter of law, “invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected” prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[P]rivate parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.