MEMORANDUM **
Roger Alan Gauthier appeals the district courts judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Securitys denial of Gauthiers application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of Dr. Blosser. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ discounted the opinions of Dr. Blosser because they were not supported by the medical record and relied heavily on Gauthiers subjective complaints. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating physicians opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimants self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible.”) (quoting Morgan v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (an ALJ need not accept an opinion that is “inadequately supported by clinical findings”).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJs decision to give greater weight to the opinions of two state agency reviewing physicians and an examining physician. See id. (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (an examining physicians “opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence, because it rests on his own independent examination” of the claimant).
The ALJ did not err in failing to specifically reference the August 2014 venous ultrasound study. The ALJ did reference Dr. Rills September 5, 2014 office note, which mentions the venous ultrasound and specifically discussed portions of the September 5, 2014 note concerning the cardiac ultrasound and the nuclear stress test. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (the ALJ must interpret the medical evidence and discuss significant probative evidence, but is not required to discuss every medical record).
The ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Gauthiers testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms, including that it was not supported by the objective medical record and that his course of treatment was conservative. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (evidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a claimants testimony regarding the severity of an impairment); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimants pain and its disabling effects.”). Any error in the ALJs additional reasoning was harmless. See Bray v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ properly gave germane reasons for discounting the opinion of Gauthiers neighbor, Ms. Nelson. The ALJ found her statement inconsistent with the medical evidence and discounted it for the same reasons it discounted Gauthiers similar testimony. See Valentine v. Commr Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (where the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimants own subjective complaints, and the lay witnesss testimony was similar, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting the lay witnesss testimony).
The ALJs determination of residual functional capacity (“RFC”) was supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We will affirm the ALJs determination of ․ RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and his decision is supported by substantial evidence.”).
As to Gauthiers argument that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not incorporate all his limitations, the ALJ is not required to incorporate opinion evidence that was permissibly discounted. See Batson v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, at Step 5 the government can carry its burden through use of the Guidelines or through vocational expert testimony. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ found Gauthier could perform a full range of light work and that the Medical-Vocational Guidelines directed a finding of not disabled. The vocational expert also identified three specific light work positions that Gauthier could perform.
AFFIRMED.