HICKMAN v. Bank of America, N.A., Custodian; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Real-parties-in-interest. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-27No. No. 20-15354

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Hickman's action, finding that his malicious prosecution claims lacked the necessary factual allegations and that the denial of leave to amend was proper.

Patrick Hickman appealed the dismissal of his civil action against Bank of America and Wells Fargo, which arose from his criminal prosecution for theft. Hickman's malicious prosecution claims failed because he did not adequately allege that the prosecution lacked probable cause or that the criminal proceedings ended in his favor, both required elements under federal and state law. The district court properly declined to permit amendment of the complaint, as doing so would prejudice the defendants and Hickman could have raised those claims earlier.

Hickman also argued he should have been allowed to pursue claims under the Right to Financial Privacy Act based on information obtained after discovery closed. The court rejected this argument, noting that only federal agencies and financial institutions may be held liable under that statute, and suppression is not an available remedy. The court further rejected Hickman's unsupported allegations of judicial bias and his request for discovery on dismissed claims.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether malicious prosecution claims were adequately pleaded
Whether leave to amend the complaint should have been granted
Whether the Right to Financial Privacy Act provided a viable claim
Whether the district court exhibited bias

Procedural posture

Hickman appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his action on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Patrick Hickman appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to his criminal prosecution for theft. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district courts judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hickmans malicious prosecution claims because Hickman failed to allege facts sufficient to show lack of probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim); LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 38 P.3d 877, 879 (Nev. 2002) (elements of malicious prosecution under Nevada state law). Hickman contends that his actions did not constitute a crime under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.130 but Hickman was not charged or prosecuted under that statute.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hickman leave to amend because granting leave would have prejudiced defendants and because the new claims Hickman alleged in his second amended complaint could have been brought in his earlier complaints. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review, listing the factors for which leave to amend may be denied, and noting that “[p]rejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor”). Contrary to Hickmans contention that information he received after the close of discovery would support new claims under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, only agencies or departments of the United States and financial institutions are liable under this statute and there is no remedy of suppression. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (providing for civil penalties against an “agency or department of the United States or financial institution”); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (no remedy of suppression).

We reject as without merit Hickmans contentions that the district court and Magistrate Judge Koppe worked in concert to ensure that Hickmans case would be dismissed and that he was entitled to damages discovery on his dismissed claims.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.