HICKMAN v. Bank of America, N.A., Custodian; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Real-parties-in-interest. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-27No. No. 20-15354

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Hickman's action, finding his malicious prosecution claims inadequately pleaded, his request for leave to amend properly denied, and his Right to Financial Privacy Act arguments without merit.

Patrick Hickman, representing himself, appealed a district court judgment that dismissed his lawsuit against Bank of America and Wells Fargo. His claims arose from his criminal prosecution for theft and included allegations under federal and state law. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal de novo and upheld the district court's decision on all grounds.

The court found that Hickman's malicious prosecution claims failed because he did not adequately allege the necessary elements—specifically, he did not establish lack of probable cause or that the criminal proceedings ended in his favor. Additionally, the court determined that the district court properly denied Hickman's request to file additional amended complaints, since granting such leave would prejudice the defendants and the new claims could have been raised earlier. The court also rejected Hickman's argument about the Right to Financial Privacy Act, noting that private individuals cannot assert claims under that statute; only federal agencies and financial institutions may be liable, and suppression is not an available remedy.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether Hickman adequately pleaded elements of malicious prosecution under federal and Nevada law
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to file an amended complaint
Whether Hickman could assert claims under the Right to Financial Privacy Act
Whether the court and magistrate judge coordinated to dismiss the case

Procedural posture

Hickman appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his federal and state law claims related to his criminal prosecution.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Patrick Hickman appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to his criminal prosecution for theft. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district courts judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hickmans malicious prosecution claims because Hickman failed to allege facts sufficient to show lack of probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim); LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 38 P.3d 877, 879 (Nev. 2002) (elements of malicious prosecution under Nevada state law). Hickman contends that his actions did not constitute a crime under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.130 but Hickman was not charged or prosecuted under that statute.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hickman leave to amend because granting leave would have prejudiced defendants and because the new claims Hickman alleged in his second amended complaint could have been brought in his earlier complaints. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review, listing the factors for which leave to amend may be denied, and noting that “[p]rejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor”). Contrary to Hickmans contention that information he received after the close of discovery would support new claims under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, only agencies or departments of the United States and financial institutions are liable under this statute and there is no remedy of suppression. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (providing for civil penalties against an “agency or department of the United States or financial institution”); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (no remedy of suppression).

We reject as without merit Hickmans contentions that the district court and Magistrate Judge Koppe worked in concert to ensure that Hickmans case would be dismissed and that he was entitled to damages discovery on his dismissed claims.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.