SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant-Appellant Richard Lockett appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.) entered on February 3, 2020, revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a one-year term of imprisonment to be followed by no further term of supervised release. On appeal, Lockett argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. We assume the readers familiarity with the record.
Before reaching the merits of Locketts appeal, we have an obligation to consider whether we have subject matter jurisdiction. During the course of this appeal, Lockett completed his revocation sentence and was released from prison.
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Once a defendants sentence has expired, “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole—some collateral consequence of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lockett has not asserted any legal injury flowing from his already-expired revocation sentence, nor does the record reveal any “concrete and continuing” injury. Id. First and foremost, Lockett has already served his full revocation sentence. See United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding moot the defendants challenge to the district courts refusal to reduce his prison sentence, because the defendant “ha[d] already been released from prison”); see also United States v. Wiltshire, 772 F.3d 976, 978–79 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that a defendants appeal is moot when “the sole penalty imposed” has already been served). The district court imposed no period of supervised release to follow his latest prison term, so there is no lingering term of supervised release that could be reduced on remand. See Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664 (holding that appeal was “not entirely moot” because “the district court could still reduce [the defendants] term of supervised release”); accord United States v. Kleiner, 765 F.3d 155, 156 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014). Moreover, any “collateral effect” on any potential sentence he might receive for his newest conviction is too speculative to satisfy Article IIIs case-or-controversy requirement. See United States v. Martin, 974 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[A] challenge to the length of a completed sentence does not present a live controversy solely by virtue of its collateral effect or consequence on future sentencing.”). Lockett has not offered any reason why his appeal presents a live case or controversy, and we cannot discern any ourselves.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby DISMISS Locketts appeal as moot.
FOOTNOTES
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. While serving his sentence, Lockett was charged for an unrelated offense, namely a 2017 escape from federal custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a) and 4082(a). Some time after being released in the present case, he was re-arrested on the new charge, pleaded guilty to that offense, and is currently detained pending sentencing.