SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Joshua Harris, proceeding pro se, challenged a notice of delinquency issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”) for his 2013 and 2014 income taxes in the U.S. Tax Court. The Tax Court dismissed the case and entered a judgment in the amount that the Commissioner claimed on the notice after Harris failed to appear for trial, without accounting for deductions to which the Commissioner had conceded in a pretrial memorandum that Harris was entitled. In his first appeal, we affirmed the Tax Courts decision in all respects “except for the exclusion of the Commissioners pretrial concessions” from its calculation of Harriss 2013 and 2014 tax deficiencies and penalties, and we remanded with instructions for the Tax Court to determine whether the exclusion of these concessions was error and, if so, to recalculate the deficiencies and penalties. Harris v. Commr of Internal Revenue, 748 F. Appx 387, 390 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). The Tax Court recalculated the deficiencies and penalties on remand, and Harris appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
“We review de novo the Tax Courts legal conclusions and for clear error its factual findings.” Chai v. Commr of Internal Revenue, 851 F.3d 190, 204 (2d Cir. 2017); see 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We also review de novo whether a lower courts decision comports with this Courts mandate. Statek Corp. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc. (In re Coudert Brothers LLP), 809 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2015).
As a preliminary matter, it is clear from the record that a stray reference to the 2009 and 2010 tax years in the Commissioners calculations on remand was a scriveners error, which the Commissioner later corrected. Harris does not otherwise argue on appeal that, if the Tax Court was limited to those deductions that the Commissioner conceded in his pretrial memorandum, its calculation of his tax deficiencies and penalties for the 2013 and 2014 tax years was incorrect. He has thus abandoned that issue. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995).
Instead, Harris principally argues that the Tax Court should have found that he had no tax liabilities because he could substantiate additional deductions, or because the proceedings were time-barred and the Commissioner had denied him access to necessary discovery or otherwise refused to cooperate with him prior to the first trial. However, the mandate rule bars a lower court from considering issues that were expressly or impliedly resolved by this Courts mandate. Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir. 2002) (mandate rule also bars lower courts from considering previously waived issues on remand). We agree with the Tax Court that our mandate did not permit consideration of deductions not conceded by the Commissioner. See Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To determine whether an issue may be reconsidered on remand,” a lower court “should look to both the specific dictates of the remand order as well as the broader spirit of the mandate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1226 (mandate remanding “for resentencing” was for limited—not de novo—resentencing where the Courts decision identified one potential Guidelines error and found all of the appellants other claims to be without merit). It also barred consideration of Harriss defenses related to the statute of limitations, the Commissioners alleged failure to audit his taxes, or the Commissioners alleged misconduct prior to the first trial—which were all issues that Harris raised, or could have raised, prior to the Tax Courts dismissal order or in the first appeal, and were thus impliedly resolved by this Courts mandate. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1225.
To the extent that Harris argues that we should consider these issues in the first instance, under the related law of the case doctrine, we ordinarily refrain from considering issues that we expressly or impliedly decided in a prior decision, including issues that were waived in the earlier proceedings. See id. at 1229; see also id. at 1225 (observing that, absent an intervening decision by a higher court, the law of the case doctrine applicable to an appellate court is “more flexible” than the mandate rule applicable to a district court on remand). We will not depart from this rule “absent cogent and compelling reasons such as an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Harris has not shown that such reasons are present here.
As to Harriss remaining arguments, the Tax Court did not clearly err in declining to credit Harriss claim that the Commissioner made additional oral concessions that should have been incorporated into the recalculation of his tax deficiencies and penalties. This claim was supported only by Harriss own statements to the Tax Court and, as the Tax Court observed, these statements were vague as to the specifics of the alleged concessions. See Am. Valmar Intl Ltd., Inc. v. Commr of Internal Revenue, 229 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that this Court owes “particularly strong deference” to Tax Courts “determination of witnesses’ credibility” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Harriss claim, the Commissioners decision not to concede his entitlement to additional deductions on remand was not misconduct. Finally, Harriss judicial bias claim principally turns on his claim that the Tax Court misinterpreted this Courts mandate or failed to sanction the Commissioners alleged misconduct on remand. These decisions were not inappropriate; in any event, “adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judges impartiality.” Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009).
We have considered all of Harriss arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Tax Court.