OPINION *
We previously affirmed Julius Greers conviction and held that he was not entitled to relief even though his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated. After reviewing the record for plain error, we found “nothing in the record to suggest that the district courts erroneous decision to grant the governments moot continuance request affected the outcome of this case.” 1
While Greers petition for certiorari review of that decision was pending before the Supreme Court, we issued a precedential opinion in United States v. Reese.
2
In Reese, we concluded that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act must result in dismissal of the indictment because “[t]he remedy provision of the Act leaves no room for a prejudice or harmless error analysis.”
3
Accordingly, we granted Greers subsequent petition to recall the mandate denying relief in this case and granted panel rehearing.
Our precedential decision in Reese now controls our review of Greers appeal. Since we held in Reese that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act requires reversal, it is clear that Greers conviction is not subject to plain error review. Accordingly, Greers conviction must be vacated.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Greers conviction and remand for dismissal of the indictment.
4
FOOTNOTES
1
. United States v. Greer, 734 F. Appx 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding “we may reverse only if, inter alia, the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted), judgment entered (Sept. 27, 2018), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2667, 204 L.Ed.2d 1073 (2019), rehg granted, order vacated, 786 F. Appx 383 (3d Cir. 2019). 2
. 917 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2019).
3
. Id. at 184 (“As Justice Alito explained for a unanimous Supreme Court in Zedner[ v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006)], [t]he relevant provisions of the Act are unequivocal․ When a trial is not commenced within the prescribed period of time, the information or indictment shall be dismissed.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 4
. On remand, the district court “needs to decide in the first instance whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice per the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).” Id.
McKEE, Circuit Judge