UNITED STATES v. GRIGSBY (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.2021-09-10No. No. 21-3014

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's judgment striking Grigsby's restitution modification motion is affirmed.

Philip Grigsby, serving a 260-year sentence for sexual exploitation of a minor and related offenses, filed a motion requesting that his restitution payments be directed to the victim directly rather than through her mother, now that the victim has reached adulthood. The district court dismissed the motion, finding that Grigsby lacked standing to bring it. Grigsby appealed, claiming both he and the victim were being denied due process and that the victim was being denied restitution rights.

The appellate court upheld the district court's decision, finding that Grigsby failed to satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. The court noted that Grigsby's arguments centered on the victim's rights rather than any injury to himself, and he failed to identify any legal basis for a right to make direct restitution payments. The court also rejected Grigsby's newly raised claims of judicial bias and prosecutorial misconduct, finding neither supported by the record.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a restitution order on behalf of the victim
Whether a defendant has a legal right to make direct restitution payments to a victim upon reaching majority
Whether adverse judicial rulings constitute evidence of judicial bias without additional support

Procedural posture

Grigsby appealed the district court's decision to strike his motion for modification of a restitution order on standing grounds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

In 2012, Appellant Philip Andra Grigsby pleaded guilty to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of possessing child pornography, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Grigsby, 749 F.3d 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2014). In addition to receiving a sentence of 260 years’ imprisonment, Grigsby was ordered to pay restitution to the victim and her mother. United States v. Grigsby, 630 F. Appx. 838, 839 (10th Cir. 2015).

On January 8, 2021, Grigsby filed a motion with the district court seeking modification of the restitution order. Specifically, he sought an order requiring that restitution payments owed to the victim now be made directly to the victim, who has reached the age of majority. The district court struck Grigsbys motion, concluding he lacked standing. In the instant appeal, Grigsby challenges the district courts judgment, asserting that (1) he and the victim are being denied due process and (2) the victim is being denied her right to restitution.

There was no reversible error in the district courts disposition of Grigsbys motion. “Article III standing requires the plaintiff to have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Grigsby has not met these requirements. To the contrary, the bulk of his opening brief focuses on the rights of the victim, not his own rights. He concedes the victim is entitled to restitution and wholly fails to explain how the granting of his motion would provide him with relief from any injury in fact.

Grigsby attempts to remedy this failure in his reply brief by asserting his due process rights are being violated because the restitution payments are not being made directly to the person to whom he owes the obligation. This argument is unavailing because Grigsby fails to identify the source of any alleged right he has to make restitution payments directly to the victim when she reaches the age of majority.

To the extent Grigsby argues his standing to protect the rights of the victim flows from the Fourteenth Amendments right to familial association, his briefing is deficient and he has failed to direct this court to any precedent holding a parent has such rights with respect to a competent adult child.

For the first time on appeal, Grigsby also argues the district court was biased against him. Because Grigsby did not request that the district court judge recuse himself, we review the question of whether his due process rights were violated because of judicial bias only for plain error. See United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 2005). Grigsby supports his assertion of error by arguing the district court incorrectly adjudicated his claims. Because adverse rulings “do not in themselves support a bias charge,” Grigsby has failed to show error. Id. at 1298.

Grigsby also alleges for the first time on appeal that the Assistant United States Attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during this appeal. Even assuming a prosecutorial misconduct claim can be raised in a matter like the one before this court, we have reviewed the entire appellate record and can find no support for Grigsbys allegations.

The judgment of the district court striking Grigsbys motion is affirmed. Grigsbys motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is granted.

FOOTNOTES

. No such right flows from the Child Pornography Restitution statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259.

Michael R. Murphy, Circuit Judge