EDWARDS v. << (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-27No. No. 17-16459

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment approving the class action settlement.

Christopher Andrews appealed a district court's approval of a class action settlement. The appellate court upheld the settlement, finding that the class notice satisfied procedural and constitutional requirements because an expert determined that at least 75 percent of class members received notice. The court also rejected Andrews' other objections, including his claim that a Spanish-language notice was required, his challenges to incentive payments awarded to named plaintiffs, and his arguments that oral argument restrictions violated his rights.

The court held that Andrews lacked standing to challenge the absence of a Spanish notice because he had not shown a personal injury from that particular deficiency. The court found no abuse of discretion in awarding the named plaintiffs $5,000 each as incentive payments, noting that the disparity between their compensation and that of other class members does not by itself create a conflict of interest. The court also found that the district judge did not violate due process by limiting Andrews' oral argument time, since he had a full opportunity to brief his issues in writing.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether class notice satisfied Rule 23 and due process requirements
Whether a Spanish-language version of the notice was required
Whether incentive payments to named plaintiffs created improper conflicts of interest
Whether restrictions on oral argument violated due process and First Amendment rights

Procedural posture

Christopher Andrews appealed pro se from the district court's judgment and order approving a class action settlement.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Christopher Andrews appeals pro se from the district courts judgment and order approving a class action settlement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court properly found that the plaintiffs’ class notice satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and due process because, among other things, the plaintiffs’ expert opined that at least 75 percent of the class received notice. See Torrisi v. Tucson Electric Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating standard of review and indicating that adequate notice is measured by whether the class as a whole receives adequate notice, not whether all individual class members receive notice). As for Andrews’ assertion that a Spanish version of the notice was required, Andrews does not have standing to make this argument. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (“To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and individual way.’ ”) (simplified); Dixon v. Wallowa Cnty., 336 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to address an argument that the appellant “lack[ed] standing to make”); Knisley v. Network Assocs., Inc., 312 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”) (simplified).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding each named plaintiff an incentive payment of $5,000. See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining standard of review). Contrary to Andrews’ argument, the disparity between the incentive payment and the payment to class members is, on its own, insufficient to create a conflict of interest. See id. at 943. We further note that, in this case, the named plaintiffs were required to participate in multiple rounds of discovery and to sit for depositions. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. W. Publg Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (incentive awards are intended, among other things, “to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class”).

We reject as without merit Andrews’ arguments that the district court violated his due process and First Amendment rights when it restricted the scope of his oral argument. See, e.g., Pac. Harbor Cap., Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n opportunity to be heard does not require an oral or evidentiary hearing on the issue․ The opportunity to brief the issue fully satisfies due process requirements.” (citations omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Andrews’ argument that the district court abused its discretion in overruling Andrews’ objections regarding the public availability of the expert reports produced for the case.

AFFIRMED.