HOUGH v. SEIU LOCAL 521 (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-27No. No. 19-15792

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that a public sector union may invoke a good-faith defense to block monetary liability for agency fees collected before the Supreme Court's Janus decision.

William Hough sued SEIU Local 521 under federal civil rights law, claiming the union violated his First Amendment rights by collecting compulsory agency fees (also called fair share fees) from him. Hough sought to pursue this as a class action and sought monetary damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union, and Hough appealed.

The appeals court upheld the district court's decision. The court ruled that public sector unions can assert a good-faith defense against claims for monetary damages under federal civil rights law when the union collected agency fees before the Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Janus v. AFSCME. The union could rely on what was then established law and valid state law when it collected the fees, which shields it from liability for those past collections even if the law later changed.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

First Amendment rights and compulsory agency fees
Good-faith defense to monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Retroactive application of Janus v. AFSCME to past fee collections

Procedural posture

Hough appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the union.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

William Hough appeals from the district courts summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 putative class action alleging a First Amendment claim arising out of compulsory agency fees (also known as fair share fees) paid to SEIU Local 521. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1130, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1265, 209 L.Ed.2d 7 (Jan. 25, 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because a public sector union can, as a matter of law, “invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected” prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1097-99 (“[P]rivate parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.