LOPEZ v. CACHE COUNTY (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.2021-08-27No. No. 21-4027

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's judgment dismissing the case and denying the motions for appointment of counsel and entry of default is affirmed.

Jerry Ernest Lopez, representing himself, sued Cache County and Judge Terry Moore under federal civil rights law, claiming the county employed the judge who presided over his criminal case and unconstitutionally convicted and sentenced him. The district court dismissed the case during initial screening for failing to state a valid claim and rejected Lopez's requests for a lawyer and for entry of default judgment against the defendants.

The appellate court upheld the dismissal on multiple grounds. Lopez waived his right to challenge the dismissal by not arguing against the district court's reasoning on appeal. Even if he had challenged it, the claims would fail because municipalities cannot be sued under a theory that holds an employer liable simply for employing someone who committed a wrong. Additionally, judges enjoy absolute immunity from lawsuits for money damages when their actions were taken in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Lopez's request for appointed counsel, as the case presented no unusual complexity, and his request for default judgment was premature because the defendants had not yet been served with the complaint.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory based on employment
Whether a judge is protected by absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 claims arising from judicial acts
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying appointment of counsel and entry of default

Procedural posture

A pro se prisoner's appeal from a district court's dismissal of a § 1983 civil rights complaint and denial of ancillary motions.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Jerry Ernest Lopez, a former prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cache County, Utah and Judge Terry Moore, alleging the County employed Judge Moore, who presided over a case in which Lopez was unconstitutionally convicted and sentenced.

The district court dismissed the case on screening for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and denied Lopezs earlier motions for appointment of counsel and entry of default. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

On appeal, Lopez does not challenge the district courts grounds for dismissing his claims, thereby waiving appellate review of that ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that failure to challenge the district courts reasoning waives appellate review); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern all litigants and that the failure to adequately brief an issue constitutes waiver). Even if he had challenged that ruling, there was no error in dismissing the claims against Cache County because Lopez improperly relied on a respondeat superior theory of liability by alleging the County employed Judge Moore. See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Likewise, the claims against Judge Moore are barred by absolute judicial immunity because they are predicated on alleged action taken in the judges judicial capacity, with no allegation that the judge acted in the absence of all jurisdiction. See Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[J]udges are generally immune from suits for money damages” unless “the act is not taken in the judges judicial capacity” or “when the act, though judicial in nature, is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Lopezs motions for appointment of counsel and entry of default. See Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing denial of motion for counsel for abuse of discretion); Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 761 (10th Cir. 2010) (same regarding motion for default). Lopez says the complexity of this case warranted appointment of counsel, but nothing in the amended complaint is so complex as to suggest an abuse of discretion. And because the district court dismissed this case on screening, without service of either the initial complaint or the amended complaint, the motion for default was premature. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (specifying time to answer “after being served” the complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3) (specifying time to respond “after service” of an amended complaint).

The district courts judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

. Because Lopez is pro se, we afford his materials a solicitous construction, but we will not advocate on his behalf, and like all litigants, he must comply with the fundamental requirements of our procedural rules. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge