UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-26No. No. 19-50131

Summary · law.co

Holding. The sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing because the district court lacked legal authority to impose a below-minimum sentence based solely on a substantial-assistance motion under the guidelines without a corresponding government motion authorizing departure below the statutory minimum.

The government appealed a nine-year sentence imposed below the statutory minimum. The district court had relied on a substantial-assistance motion under the sentencing guidelines to justify going below the mandatory minimum, but this reasoning was legally incorrect. Under Supreme Court precedent, a guidelines-based motion for substantial assistance permits departure from the guideline range only, not from statutory minimums; a separate government motion under a different statute is required to authorize a below-minimum sentence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a substantial-assistance motion under sentencing guidelines authorizes departure below statutory minimum
What government motion is required to sentence below mandatory minimum
District court's authority to compel government substantial-assistance motion

Procedural posture

The government appealed the district court's below-minimum sentence to the circuit court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

The U.S. Attorney appeals from the district courts sentence of nine years, one year below the statutory minimum. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). We vacate and remand for resentencing.

The district court erred by concluding that a motion to reduce the Guideline range under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 also authorized a sentence below the statutory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Although both motions have as a prerequisite that the defendant provided “substantial assistance,” the Supreme Court has held that the “Government must in some way indicate its desire or consent that the court depart below the statutory minimum before the court may do so.” Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 n.5, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996). The Supreme Court has also explained that “a motion under § 5K1.1 permitted departure from the guideline sentence, but that the departure could not extend below the mandatory minimum absent an additional motion by the government under § 3553(e).” United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2003). The district courts reliance on our decision in United States v. Lee was misplaced, because the prosecutor in that case had moved for a downward departure “from both the guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentence.” 725 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992), defendant urges affirmance on the theory that the district court found that the U.S. Attorneys failure to file a motion under § 3553(e) was irrational. We reject that argument. The district court here made clear that it sentenced the defendant to a below-minimum sentence because of its erroneous understanding of its legal authority, not based on a factual finding that the U.S. Attorney had acted irrationally.

We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for sentencing in compliance with the law. “On remand, the district court generally should be free to consider any matters relevant to sentencing, even those that may not have been raised at the first sentencing hearing, as if it were sentencing de novo.” United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). We note, however, that a district courts authority to compel the U.S. Attorney to file a substantial-assistance motion is circumscribed. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 186–87, 112 S.Ct. 1840; United States v. Flores, 559 F.3d 1016, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2009).

VACATED AND REMANDED.