MEMORANDUM **
Martin Clark Anderson appeals pro se from the district courts order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Contrary to Andersons argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion.
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The record reflects that the district court considered Andersons arguments regarding his medical conditions and rehabilitative efforts. However, the court concluded that, even if Anderson had demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying relief, a reduced sentence was not warranted in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors, particularly the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (district court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors on a motion for compassionate release); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C). Because the courts conclusion is supported by the record, it did not abuse its discretion by denying relief. See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (a district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record).
We do not reach Andersons argument that the district court erred in its application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 because the record does not support Andersons contention that the district court relied upon that guideline to deny his motion.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. The denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). The parties agree that the abuse of discretion standard also applies to denials under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which we accept for purposes of this appeal.