CLAPP v. Christiana Daniell Mendoza; et al., Defendants. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-23No. No. 20-15116

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Clapp's federal civil rights and state law claims because Clapp failed to allege sufficient facts to establish municipal liability, a failure-to-train theory, or compliance with California's claim presentment requirement.

William Henry Clapp filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging two arrests and also asserted state law claims. The district court dismissed the entire case, and Clapp appealed. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal and found the district court acted properly in removing the case from the docket. Clapp's federal claims failed because he did not provide sufficient factual allegations showing either a constitutional violation stemming from an official policy or custom, or alternatively, a failure-to-train claim against the City and County of San Francisco. His state law claims also fell short because he did not adequately allege that he complied with California's requirement that plaintiffs present claims to government entities before filing suit. The court further determined the district judge did not abuse her authority in refusing to allow Clapp to file yet another revised complaint after he had already been given multiple opportunities to fix the legal deficiencies.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Municipal liability under § 1983 for constitutional violations arising from official policy or custom
Requirements for a failure-to-train claim against a municipality
Compliance with California Government Claims Act claim presentment requirement
Discretion to deny leave to amend after multiple prior amendments

Procedural posture

Clapp appealed pro se from a district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his federal civil rights and state law claims arising from two arrests.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

William Henry Clapp appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of two arrests. We review de novo a district courts dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Clapps federal claims because Clapp failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered a constitutional violation as a result of an official policy or custom. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to establish municipal liability); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish custom.”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). To the extent Clapp intended to allege a failure-to-train claim, dismissal was proper because Clapp failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant City and County of San Francisco failed to train its officers properly and that the failure to train caused a deprivation of his rights. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing requirements to establish failure-to-train claim).

The district court properly dismissed Clapps state law claims because Clapp failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he complied with, or was excused from, the claim presentment requirement of the California Government Claims Act. See Cal. Govt Code § 911.2; State v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal.4th 1234, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116, 122 (2004) (plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement; otherwise, complaint is subject to general demurrer).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clapp leave to file an eighth amended complaint after explaining the deficiencies in his prior complaints and giving Clapp a prior opportunity to amend. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a “district courts discretion in denying amendment is particularly broad when it has previously given leave to amend” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Clapps contention that the district court was biased against him.

Clapps motions for extensions of time to file his reply brief (Docket Entry Nos. 28 & 29) are denied as moot because Clapp timely filed his reply brief.

AFFIRMED.