MENDEZ v. CITY OF BOISE (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-23No. No. 20-35474

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Mendez's claims for failure to state legally sufficient allegations supporting his procedural due process and FDCPA claims, and affirmed the denial of leave to amend as futile.

Raul Mendez appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against the City of Boise concerning sewer fees. He raised claims under federal procedural due process law and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), along with state law claims. The appellate court examined whether the district court properly dismissed his case and whether he should have been allowed to revise his complaint before dismissal.

The court found no error in the dismissal. Mendez's due process claim failed because he did not adequately describe facts showing he was denied any procedural opportunity before being charged the sewer fees; general municipal fee policies typically do not trigger individual due process protections. His FDCPA claim also fell short because he did not sufficiently allege that any defendant qualified as a debt collector under the statute's definition. Since any proposed amendments would likely suffer the same legal defects, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Mendez to amend his complaint.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether sewer fee disputes implicate procedural due process rights
Whether a municipality constitutes a debt collector under the FDCPA
Whether leave to amend should be granted when amendment would be futile

Procedural posture

Mendez appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his federal and state law claims arising from a sewer fee dispute.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Raul Mendez appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of a dispute regarding sewer fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district courts dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Mendezs procedural due process claim because Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was denied any process to which he was entitled prior to being charged sewer fees. See Hotel & Motel Assn of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 968-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “laws of general applicability affecting a broad geographic area” ordinarily do not implicate individual procedural due process concerns).

The district court properly dismissed Mendezs Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because, even assuming the sewer fees qualified as a “debt” under the FDCPA, Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” under the FDCPA as “any person ․ who regularly collects or attempts to collect ․ debts owed ․ another”); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).

We reject as meritless Mendezs contention that the district court failed to liberally construe his complaint.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.