Samuel Knowles appeals the district courts denial of his motion for a new trial, filed more than twelve years after his 2008 convictions on charges of conspiracy to commit drug offenses. The district court sua sponte denied the motion as untimely.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendants motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Where, as here, a motion is not based on newly discovered evidence, it “must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2). The Supreme Court explained in Eberhart v. United States that the timeliness of a Rule 33 motion is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule, and the government can forfeit its defense of untimeliness if it fails to raise the defense before the district court reaches the merits of the Rule 33 motion. See 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam). But neither Eberhart nor any precedent of which we are aware precludes a district court from applying the claim-processing rule set forth in Rule 33 to determine sua sponte that a motion is untimely. Nor does Knowles make that contention.
Knowles moved for a new trial twelve years too late and did not present a reason for the delay. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte denying his motion as untimely. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2).
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM: