Steve Austin, Jr. seeks relief from what he contends was a wrongful federal conviction. In 2007, the federal government charged Austin with burglarizing a post office in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. Austin pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 33 months in prison plus a term of supervised release. He ended up violating his term of supervised release and was sentenced to a revocation term of 21 months in prison. He completed his sentence and was released from federal custody in 2014.
Six years later, Austin, proceeding pro se, moved in federal district court for relief from the 2007 conviction. As he explains on appeal, the police found him at the post office not because he was burglarizing it, but because he was at a nearby restaurant, heard someone break in, and was there following up when the police arrived. He emphasizes that no eyewitnesses testified to his burglarizing the post office, that no fingerprint evidence supported the allegations against him, and that, in any event, nothing was stolen from the post office.
Austin asked the district court to vacate his conviction but didnt say what specifically authorized the court to grant that remedy. The district court thus addressed three possible sources of authority under which it could evaluate his claims: 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), and the writ of coram nobis. The court determined that it would lack jurisdiction under § 2255 and Rule 60(b)(3), and that Austin failed to satisfy the requirements for a writ of coram nobis. On appeal, Austin contends that the district court erred and reiterates that he was wrongfully convicted.
I
We conclude that the district court was correct. Regardless of the merits and demerits of Austins claim that he was wrongfully convicted, we arent now in a position to adjudicate that case. Because Austin is no longer in federal custody pursuant to the conviction at issue, we cant authorize relief pursuant to § 2255. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). And because his 2007 conviction arose in a criminal case, rather than a civil case, we cant authorize relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). See United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003).
As for the writ of coram nobis, it authorizes courts to vacate a conviction only when (1) no other remedy is available, (2) the petitioner presents sound reasons for failing to seek relief earlier, and (3) the petitioner seeks to remedy an error “of the most fundamental character” that rendered the original proceeding “irregular and invalid.” United States v. Mills, 221 F.3d 1201, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Austin just doesnt meet that extraordinarily high standard. As to element (2), he hasnt shown us that he couldnt have sought the relief on direct appeal or through a timely § 2255 motion. And as to element (3), we dont think that Austin has shown that the proceedings leading to his original conviction—which consisted of an indictment and guilty plea—were irregular or invalid, or that any fundamental error occurred. Accordingly, we cant grant the writ.
1
II
Austin separately moved in the district court for certain documents relating to his past court cases. The district court denied that motion and Austin appealed that denial as well. But on appeal, Austin clarifies that he doesnt need the documents himself, but rather wanted to make sure that the reviewing court had them for its review. The documents are needed, he says “for the Court to ‘decide’ the motion[,] not for the petitioner to prepare.” Weve been able to access all of the documents that we needed for the purpose of our review, so we think that Austins concerns, as articulated on appeal, have been addressed. To the extent that he does appeal the district courts denial of his document request, we will affirm because the law gives him no freestanding right to the documents that he requested. See United States v. Cuya, 964 F.3d 969, 972 (11th Cir. 2020); Campbell v. United States, 538 F.2d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1976).
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. In his reply brief, Austin suggested that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because he raised it for the first time in his reply brief, this claim isnt before us. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).
PER CURIAM: