Tairan Blake sustained injuries in a multi-vehicle collision that he alleges resulted from the negligence of defendants Tribe Express, Inc. (“Tribe”), and Marquentin Prosser, its employee, who ran on foot into traffic on I-75 North in Henry County, setting off a chain of events that culminated in the collision. The trial court found that Prosser was acting outside the scope of his employment with Tribe at the time of the collision and granted summary judgment to Tribe. Blake appeals that ruling, contending that a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute. We disagree and affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). This Court reviews a trial courts summary judgment ruling de novo, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Advanced Disposal Servs. Atlanta v. Marczak, 359 Ga. App. 316, 316, 857 S.E.2d 494 (2021).
The material facts of this case are largely undisputed. Viewed in the light most favorable to Blake, the non-movant, the record shows that Prosser was employed by Tribe as a truck driver, and, on November 1, 2017, he made a delivery on Tribes behalf to Montgomery, Alabama, while driving a Tribe-owned tractor-trailer. Prosser then drove Tribes tractor-trailer to Gordon, Georgia, to visit his mother. The trailer was empty. Upon making contact with Prosser sometime between November 1 and November 3, 2017, Tribe informed Prosser that his employment was terminated and instructed him to return its tractor-trailer to one of its two locations in Gainesville, Georgia.
On November 3, 2017, Prosser drove from Gordon to within 200 yards of Tribes Gainesville headquarters. However, rather than proceeding to Tribes headquarters, Prosser turned onto I-985 South and began driving away from Gainesville. Prosser continued onto I-85 South through Atlanta and merged onto I-75 South as he left the city. In Henry County, Prosser navigated the tractor-trailer onto the express lanes, driving through security barriers which were lowered to prevent access to the express lanes. When Prosser drove through the barriers, debris flew over the median wall and damaged a passing vehicle.
1
Prosser drove south in the express lanes for approximately two miles until he struck the side railing and brought the tractor-trailer to a stop near exit 224. He then exited the tractor-trailer, ran on foot across the express lanes, jumped a barrier, and ran into traffic on I-75 North. When Prosser darted into traffic, a sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) swerved to avoid him and, in doing so, collided with Blakes tractor-trailer. Prosser was struck and injured by a third vehicle. The police report prepared following the incident indicated that, before being transported to the hospital, Prosser had “random fits of rage” and “continually tried to get up, and walk into traffic.” The report also noted Prossers dilated pupils, rapid pulse, and elevated blood pressure. While at the hospital, Prosser did not respond to questions about what led to the collision or what substances he might have ingested. As a result of the incident, Prosser was issued citations for multiple offenses, including driving under the influence.
On September 27, 2018, a Henry County grand jury indicted Prosser for theft by taking of Tribes tractor-trailer, driving under the influence of a drug, driving under the influence of cocaine, hit and run, violation of duty upon striking a fixed object, and failure to maintain lane. On June 3, 2019, Prosser pleaded guilty to theft by taking, driving under the influence of a drug, hit and run, and violation of duty upon striking a fixed object. The remaining counts of driving under the influence of cocaine and failure to maintain lane were nolle prossed.
Blake filed this lawsuit in August 2018, asserting claims against Tribe for Prossers negligence, as well as for Tribes negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Prosser.
2
During his deposition, which took place less than a week before he pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him, Prosser testified that, on the day of the collision, he was returning the tractor-trailer to Tribe in Gainesville after being terminated, as Tribe had instructed him. Prosser stated that, upon arriving in Gainesville, he made a wrong turn and returned to the Interstate to reroute. According to Prosser, “I realized I had been going to a point where I missed my turn and had to recalculate and reroute the truck to get back on the interstate to get back off on my exit again to go in the right direction.” Prosser elaborated, “I made a wrong turn and had to reroute the truck in order to get back to where I was trying to get to of dropping the tractor and trailer off. Thats how I ended up back on the interstate thinking that I was going in my right direction.” When asked about the events leading up to the collision, what substances he might have ingested, and why he continued driving after hitting the barriers restricting access to the express lanes, Prosser invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Tribe thereafter moved for summary judgment, arguing that Blakes negligence claim against Tribe, which was premised on respondeat superior, was not valid because Prosser was acting outside the scope of his employment.
3
Specifically, Tribe argued that Prosser was operating the tractor-trailer at a place and for a purpose unauthorized by Tribe and that Prossers guilty plea to theft by taking was “direct, irrefutable evidence of his admission that he did not have authority to be in Defendant Tribes tractor-trailer at the time of the collision.” In support of its motion, Tribe submitted, among other things, Prossers indictment and the final judgment entered upon his guilty pleas. In response, Blake argued, as he does on appeal, that Prossers testimony regarding missing his turn and returning to the interstate to reroute the tractor-trailer conflicted with his guilty plea to theft by taking and thus created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Tribe at the time of the collision. Blake did not submit any evidence supporting his response in opposition to Tribes motion.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Tribe, finding that Prosser was acting outside the scope of his employment with Tribe at the time of the collision. In doing so, the trial court applied the burden-shifting framework urged by Blake, requiring Tribe to rebut the presumption that Prosser was acting in the scope of his employment, which arose because he was driving a Tribe-owned vehicle, with “clear, positive, and uncontradicted” evidence that he was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the collision.
4
The trial court found that Tribe met its burden by offering evidence that Prosser drove eighty miles away from his intended destination and pleaded guilty to theft by taking of Tribes tractor-trailer. The trial court rejected Blakes argument that Prossers testimony about making a wrong turn created a factual dispute precluding summary judgment, reasoning that the testimony and Prossers subsequent guilty plea were not in direct conflict. The trial court explained its findings as follows:
Giving [Blake] the benefit of all reasonable inferences and finding that Defendant Prosser got lost in Gainesville and got back on I-985 traveling south to recalibrate his GPS, Defendant Prosser still knew Tribes truck needed to be returned to Gainesville. It is contrary to logic or reason that a professional driver would be less than a mile from his destination and then drive 80 miles away from it without making a conscious decision to do so.
Although the trial court imposed a higher burden of proof on Tribe than was called for by the facts of this case, it correctly found that Prosser was not acting in the course and scope of his employment with Tribe at the time of the collision.
As an initial matter, we note that the trial court improperly evaluated Tribes motion for summary judgment pursuant to the burden-shifting framework enunciated in Allen Kanes Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979), and Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 226 S.E.2d 750 (1976), which establishes a rebuttable presumption that an employee is acting in the scope of his employment when he is operating his employers vehicle at the time of the collision that causes the injuries at issue. See Allen Kanes, 243 Ga. at 777, 257 S.E.2d 186; Massey, 138 Ga. App. at 565 (1), 226 S.E.2d 750. This framework, however, applies only when the employee-driven, employer-owned vehicle is involved in the collision that results in the tort-claimants injury. See Allen Kanes, 243 Ga. at 777-778, 257 S.E.2d 186. The facts of this case are distinguishable because the Tribe-owned tractor-trailer was not involved in the collision between Blakes tractor-trailer and the SUV that gave rise to this lawsuit. Instead, that collision occurred when the SUV swerved to avoid hitting Prosser after he exited Tribes tractor-trailer and darted on foot into the path of the SUV. Therefore, Tribes motion for summary judgment is properly evaluated pursuant to the general law of respondeat superior.
“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the tort of its servant only to the extent that the servant committed the tort in connection with his employment by the master, within the scope of his employment, and in furtherance of his masters business.” B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 652 (1), 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011). “[T]he general rule for determining whether the master is liable for the acts of an employee is not whether the act was done during the existence of the employment, but whether it was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the masters business for accomplishing the ends of his employment.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Whether an employee acted in furtherance of his employers business and within the scope of his employment is generally an issue to be resolved by the jury; however, “the evidence in some cases is so plain and undisputable that the court may resolve a respondeat superior claim as a matter of law.” Centurion Indus. v. Naville-Saeger, 352 Ga. App. 342, 344 (1), 834 S.E.2d 875 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Importantly, summary judgment for the master is appropriate when the evidence shows that the servant was not engaged in furtherance of his masters business but was on a private enterprise of his own.” Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 505, 508 (2), 823 S.E.2d 826 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Graham v. City of Duluth, 328 Ga. App. 496, 501 (1), 759 S.E.2d 645 (2014) (“Under Georgia law, if a servant steps aside from his masters business to do an act entirely disconnected from it, and injury to another results from the act, the servant may be liable, but the master is not liable.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, there is no evidence in the record that Prosser, at the time of the collision, was acting within the scope of his employment or in furtherance of Tribes business. In fact, as the trial court correctly found, the record contains direct evidence that Prosser was not acting in the scope of his employment or in furtherance of Tribes business in the form of Prossers guilty plea to theft by taking of Tribes tractor-trailer. “In Georgia, a guilty plea is an admission against interest and prima facie evidence of the facts admitted.” Trustgard Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 338 Ga. App. 347, 351 (1), 790 S.E.2d 115 (2016) (physical precedent only) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-8-803 (22) (evidence of final judgment entered upon guilty plea admissible “to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment”). As evidenced by his guilty plea to stealing his employers tractor-trailer, Prosser clearly acted “for purely personal reasons unconnected with [his] job” when, after exiting the stolen tractor-trailer, he darted on foot into oncoming traffic.
5
McCrary v. Middle Ga. Mgmt. Servs., 315 Ga. App. 247, 255 (2), n.26, 726 S.E.2d 740 (2012) (employer was not liable for employees tortious conduct where such conduct arose from employees effort to cover up criminal act to which employee later pleaded guilty). See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 122 Ga. App. 622, 630 (II) (6), 178 S.E.2d 268 (1970) (employees “complete departure from the scope of employment and the intended use of the [company] vehicle” relieves the vehicles owner from liability as a matter of law). Tribe thus met its burden of presenting evidence that Prosser “was not engaged in furtherance of [Tribes] business but was on a private enterprise of his own.” Lucas, 348 Ga. App. at 508-509 (2), 823 S.E.2d 826 (citation and punctuation omitted) (employer was not vicariously liable for plaintiffs injuries caused by accidental discharge of employees handgun where employee, in violation of employers policy, carried handgun into clients facility “for purely personal reasons rather than for any purpose beneficial” to his employer).
Where, as here, “a motion for summary judgment is supported by [evidence] showing a prima facie right in the movant to have judgment rendered in his favor, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce rebuttal evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Hasty v. Spruill, 207 Ga. App. 485, 486, 428 S.E.2d 420 (1993). Blake maintains that Prossers testimony that he made a wrong turn and returned to the interstate in Gainesville to reroute the tractor-trailer contradicts his guilty plea and thereby creates a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.
6
Specifically, Blake takes an inferential leap and contends that if Prosser were lost at the time of the collision (presumably as a result of the wrong turn), then he was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. However, as the trial court found, Prossers testimony that he made a wrong turn does not directly contradict his guilty plea.
7
Indeed, it is entirely plausible that Prosser made a wrong turn and navigated onto the interstate to reroute, then, at some point, decided not to return the tractor-trailer to Tribe. As the trial courts order notes, “[i]f the collision had occurred within closer proximity to Tribes headquarters ․ a jury question would arise as to whether [Prosser] was still in the course and scope of his employment.”
Moreover, Prosser did not testify that he was lost; he testified that he made a wrong turn in Gainesville, eighty miles north of the site of the collision. Thus, his testimony is, at best, circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that Prosser was lost and was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the collision. But “in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a finding of fact which may be inferred but is not demanded by circumstantial evidence has no probative value against positive and uncontradicted evidence that no such fact exists.” Patterson v. Kevon, LLC, 304 Ga. 232, 236, 818 S.E.2d 575 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Winder v. Paul Lights Buckhead Jeep Eagle Chrysler Plymouth, 249 Ga. App. 707, 711-712 (3), 549 S.E.2d 515 (2001) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence has no probative value in establishing a fact where such evidence is consistent with direct, unimpeached evidence showing the nonexistence of such fact.”). Of course, it is possible that Prosser was lost when he exited Tribes tractor-trailer and darted into traffic eighty miles south of his intended destination, but his testimony that he made a wrong turn does not necessitate that finding, and Blake points to no other evidence that would support such a finding.
8
Under these circumstances, Blakes assertion that Prosser was lost is nothing more than speculation. See Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712 (2), 580 S.E.2d 662 (2003) (circumstantial evidence that does not point more strongly to a conclusion opposite that established by direct evidence “amounts to mere speculation, conjecture, or possibility insufficient to preclude summary judgment”). Such speculation cannot defeat the positive and uncontradicted evidence that Prosser stole Tribes tractor-trailer and thus was acting for personal reasons, outside the scope of his employment, and not in furtherance of Tribes business at the time of the collision.
Blake further argues that the trial court improperly rendered determinations as to Prossers credibility, highlighting the following sentence from the trial courts order: “Even though Defendant Prosser alleges he was not aware of the location of Tribe, the Court finds these statements are not to be given credibility.” It is true, as Blake argues, that a trial court may not make credibility determinations in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, see K/C Ice, LLC v. Connell, 352 Ga. App. 376, 378 (1), 835 S.E.2d 11 (2019) (“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, neither the trial court nor this Court can consider the credibility of witnesses; and a finder of fact must resolve the question of credibility and the conflicts in the evidence which it produces.”), but the trial courts ruling did not hinge on its disbelief of Prossers testimony that he did not know where Tribe was located.
9
Instead, the trial courts decision, which gave Blake the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credited Prossers testimony that he made a wrong turn in Gainesville, was premised on the facts (proved by direct evidence) that Prosser drove eighty miles away from Gainesville after coming within 200 yards of his destination and subsequently pleaded guilty to theft by taking of Tribes tractor-trailer. The trial courts opinion of Prossers credibility thus was immaterial to its ruling and presents no cause for reversal. Cf. Dupree v. Houston County Bd. of Ed., 357 Ga. App. 38, 46-47 (2), 849 S.E.2d 778 (2020) (“Where credibility is the controlling question, summary judgment is not appropriate.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Indeed, the portions of the trial courts order that Blake contends constitute improper credibility determinations, when read in context, appear instead to be determinations that Prossers testimony about making a wrong turn does not support the reasonable inference that he simply was lost at the time of the collision. Because only reasonable inferences can give rise to a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, see Laus Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 495 (4), 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991), the trial court did not err by passing on the reasonableness of the inference that Prosser was lost, which was premised on circumstantial evidence, in light of the direct evidence that Prosser was not acting in the course and scope of his employment. Cf. Patterson, 304 Ga. at 236-237, 818 S.E.2d 575 (summary judgment not appropriate where defendants motion for summary judgment was based upon circumstantial evidence and plaintiffs “presented evidence which, although circumstantial, contradicted point by point the assertions made in” defendants motion).
Based on well settled law, the evidence is plain and undisputable that Prosser was not acting in the course and scope of his employment with Tribe when he exited the Tribe-owned tractor-trailer eighty miles away from his intended destination and ran into traffic. The trial court therefore was permitted to resolve this respondeat superior claim as a matter of law, and it did not err in granting summary judgment to Tribe.
Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Prosser was charged with hit and run in connection with this incident.
2
. Blake also asserted claims against Prosser, but Prosser is not a party to this appeal.
3
. Tribes motion for summary judgment also addressed claims asserted by Blake for Tribes negligent hiring, training, and supervision, as well as negligent entrustment of a commercial vehicle to Prosser. In granting summary judgment, the trial court found that the issues were unopposed and any argument was waived because Blake failed to address the claims in his response to Tribes motion. On appeal, Blake does not challenge the trial courts decision regarding these issues.
4
. Blakes response relied upon the standard announced by our Supreme Court in Allen Kanes Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979), while the trial court relied upon this Courts decision in Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 226 S.E.2d 750 (1976). The difference is immaterial, however, because both cases employ the same presumption and burden-shifting framework. See Allen Kanes, 243 Ga. at 777, 257 S.E.2d 186 (“Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the automobile is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of that person, a presumption arises that the employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and the burden is then on the defendant employer to show otherwise.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Massey, 138 Ga. App. at 565 (1), 226 S.E.2d 750 (“[U]nder Georgia law[,] a presumption arises [that] when a servant is operating his employers vehicle at the time of a collision, he was in the scope of his employment. The burden is then upon the master to rebut the presumption by evidence that is clear, positive and uncontradicted and that shows the servant was not in the scope of his employment.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
5
. Blake argues that “[i]t is not a ‘fact’ that ․ Prosser stole the truck” because Prossers guilty plea “is not conclusive and is only a circumstance to be considered with other evidence in a civil action for damages.” But Blake misapprehends the case law upon which he premises this assertion. Prossers guilty plea is indeed prima facie evidence of the facts admitted, i.e., that he stole Tribes tractor-trailer, but “it is not conclusive that [Prosser] was negligent.” Setliff v. Littleton, 264 Ga. App. 711, 714 (2), 592 S.E.2d 180 (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).
6
. While Blake enumerates three errors in his appellate brief, these purported errors are premised on the singular notion that Prossers deposition testimony contradicts his guilty plea and thus creates an issue of material fact that can only be resolved by a jury.
7
. Blake asserts that the trial court improperly determined that Prossers deposition testimony and guilty plea were not contradictory. However, it is well settled that “[w]hether ․ testimony is contradictory ․ is a question of law for the trial court.” Liles v. Innerwork, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 352, 353-354 (1), 631 S.E.2d 408 (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted). We find no error.
8
. Blake argues in passing that Prossers abandonment of the tractor-trailer is evidence that he was acting in the scope of his employment because Prosser “testified that he ran across the highway because he smelled gasoline and was trying to get away from the truck,” which, Blake asserts, “is what [he] was trained to do by Appellee Tribe if he smelled gasoline.” Prosser testified, however, that in the event of a suspected fuel leak, Tribes drivers handbook directed him to “[p]ull over, call 911, alert dispatch, [and] put out safety cones for bystanders and other drivers.” Prosser further acknowledged that Tribes standard operating procedure mandated that “[d]rivers will not leave their truck unattended.” Accordingly, Prossers testimony that he “was trying to get away from the truck” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was acting in the scope of his employment.
9
. The record shows that Prosser did not, in fact, testify that he was unaware of Tribes location. Instead, he testified that he did not know to which of Tribes two Gainesville locations he was supposed to return the tractor-trailer.
Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.
Barnes, P. J., and McFadden, P. J., concur.