MEMORANDUM *
Dominique James Swain appeals the district courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Swain also appeals the district courts denial of his request for an additional evidentiary hearing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court properly concluded that Officer Palmatier had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. “[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.”). The district court found that Officer Palmatier observed Swain driving with unlit headlights at 12:50 A.M.—a violation of local traffic laws that require the use of headlights from a half-hour after sunset until a half-hour before sunrise. See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 13 § 04.010(a)(1); Anchorage Mun. Code § 9.36.290.
Moreover, Officer Palmatier formed independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct a probation search. See United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Police simply may not perform unrelated investigations that prolong a stop unless they have ‘independent reasonable suspicion justifying [the] prolongation.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 2015))). When Officer Palmatier asked Swain for his drivers license, Swain represented that he did not have it with him, and he was unsure whether it was valid. Officer Palmatier returned to his patrol car and ran a computer check that revealed Swain was driving with a revoked license and that he was on probation. At this point, any extension of the stop was justified because Officer Palmatier developed independent reasonable suspicion of a probation violation due to Swain driving with a revoked license. Even if Swain did not in fact have a revoked license, Officer Palmatiers reliance on the computer checks results was reasonable, and suppression would not be warranted. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Swains request for further evidentiary hearings. See United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012). Officer Palmatiers observation that Swains headlights were off was included in his police report. He also testified to that fact at the evidentiary hearing. Swain even cross-examined Officer Palmatier on the issue. Similarly, Swain had the opportunity to address the status of his license at the evidentiary hearing but failed to do so. See United States v. Kimball, 975 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that “where a defendant ‘fail[s] to present any facts in rebuttal’ to the governments evidence, there need be no new evidentiary hearing” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1988))).
AFFIRMED.