MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty of trafficking a class B controlled substance. On appeal he contends that the judge erred in failing to suppress evidence recovered from the search of his home because the search warrant did not comply with the strict requirements of G. L. c. 276, § 2B. We affirm.
Background. The background facts are not in dispute. On March 12, 2015, Detective Charles Mello of the Seekonk Police Department applied for a search warrant for 267 Fall River Avenue in Seekonk. The warrant application form was signed by Detective Mello “under the penalties of perjury,” and signed by an assistant clerk-magistrate who witnessed the detectives signature. Attached to the application was Detective Mellos three-page affidavit in which he averred, inter alia, that he received information from other law enforcement officers including Detective Matthew Jennette of the Providence Police Department. Detective Mello further averred that Detective Jennette provided him “with an affidavit attesting to the aforementioned investigation which is attached and marked, ‘Attachment 1.’ ” Detective Jennettes statement was indeed appended to the Mello affidavit. Each page of Mellos three-page affidavit was labeled “PAGE [X] OF 7 PAGES OF THIS AFFIDAVIT,” and the page labeling continued onto Detective Jennettes statement, such that the first page of the Jennette statement was labeled “4/7,” the next page “5/7,” and so on. The Jennette statement was unsigned and did not indicate that it was witnessed by any magistrate or judicial officer.
Discussion. The defendant argues that the “Jennette affidavit” was defective because the jurat and “affidavit” were unsigned. He contends that in light of this technical violation, the search warrant application failed to supply probable cause to search the home. We disagree.
The defendants argument hinges on the notion that the Jennette statement was a technically deficient affidavit. We agree that the unsigned Jennette statement was indeed in the form of an affidavit. That notwithstanding, it was submitted as an attachment to Detective Mellos affidavit, which itself met all the requirements under G. L. c. 276, § 2B. In this sense, the Jennette statement was not an independent affidavit requiring Detective Jennettes signature and jurat. Rather, it was a statement containing material information that was (a) provided to Detective Mello, (b) incorporated by Detective Mello into his own affidavit, and (c) attached as an exhibit to Detective Mellos affidavit. There was neither error nor any legal impediment in so doing. See Commonwealth v. Truax, 397 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1986); Commonwealth v. Bass, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 972, 975 (1987). We thus agree with the judges conclusion that the Jennette statement could “be used in the probable cause analysis.” See Truax, supra at 179. Contrast Commonwealth v. Dozier, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 865, 865-866 (1977) (warrant affidavit insufficient where it “did not indicate [whom the affiant] swore in front of, if anyone”).
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In short, the defendants argument constitutes the type of hypertechnical approach that our courts have rejected in the probable cause analysis. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 573, 576 (2008); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 358 Mass. 747, 741 (1971). Therefore, the judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The defendant does not contend that the search warrant affidavit failed to provide probable cause to search the home. Rather, he argues that if the Jennette statement is excluded from our analysis, then there was insufficient information to provide probable cause. Where we conclude that the Jennette statement was properly considered in the probable cause calculus, the defendants claim is unavailing.