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SHELNUTT et al. v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA

Supreme Court of Georgia1927-01-13No. No. 5502
163 Ga. 502

Authorities cited

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Opinion

majority opinion

Gilbert, J.

1. The City of Augusta is expressly authorized by its charter to levy “a license tax upon any occupation, trade, or business carried on” within said city. Ga. Laws 1896, p. 119.

(а) The city may make reasonable classifications, but the tax must be uniform upon all falling within the same class. City Council of Augusta v. Clark, 124 Ga. 254 (52 S. E. 881).

(б) The validity of an occupation tax depends upon whether it is confiscatory and oppressive upon the class designated. Postal Telegraph &c. Co. v. Cordele, 141 Ga. 658, 665 (82 S. E. 26) ; Ray v. Tallapoosa, 142 Ga. 799 (83 S. E. 938); Adams Motor Co. v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818 (102 S. E. 440) ; Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229 (116 S. E. 795).

2. The tax ordinance is not unconstitutional for any reason assigned.

3. The evidence did not require a finding that the ordinance was administered in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.

4. The ordinance is not in restraint of trade, and is not void on that account. City of Emporia v. Endelman, 75 Kan. 428 (89 Pac. 685).

5. The prayer for relief from prosecution in the recorder’s court was withdrawn.

6. The court did not err in refusing the injunction.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Russell, C. J., and Ernes, J., (¡Assenting.

The City Council of Augusta demurred on the grounds that there was no equity in the petition; that plaintiffs had full and complete and adequate remedy at law; and that the petition was multifarious in that it set up two separate and distinct causes of action. There were special demurrers which need not be stated. The city also answered, denying discrimination and unreasonableness of the ordinance and that the ordinance was void for any of the reasons assigned. The answer alleged that “the purpose of the ordinance is to exact of plaintiffs and like persons a just and fair and reasonable license fee similar to the fee required of pawnbrokers and like dealers; and that the license fee exacted of the plaintiffs is just, fair, and reasonable, and in no wise discriminatory, unjust, unreasonable, or prohibitive.”

After a hearing the court rendered judgment reciting that it appeared from the evidence “that the petitioners have completed their business in the City of Augusta, so far as the sale of the stock of goods is concerned, and that, so far as the matters and things alleged by them in their petition for injunction, their business in the City of Augusta ceased Friday, the 21st day of May, 1926,” and ordering that “the injunction prayed for by petitioners is refused and denied.” The sole assignment of error is on the judgment refusing an injunction.

Hammond & Kennedy, for plaintiffs.

Archibald BlacJcshear, for defendant.

dissent opinion

Russell, C. J., and Hines, J.,

dissenting. An ordinance imposing an occupation tax of $100 per week, or $200 per month, upon persons conducting “fire sales,” is excessive, prohibitive, confiscatory, and unreasonable. Huguley-McCulloh Auto Co. v. LaGrange, 159 Ga. 352 (125 S. E. 799). The purpose of this ordinance is to prohibit such persons from conducting such sales in competition with local merchants, and thus to stifle competition. So we think the trial judge erred in not granting the injunction prayed.