ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
We recently held in JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 136 Nev. 596, 600-01, 475 P.3d 52, 56-57 (2020), that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12)s six-year limitation period applies to any action brought to enforce the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Consequently, appellants amended complaint asserting the Federal Foreclosure Bar was timely even if it did not relate back to appellants original complaint, and the district courts judgment was therefore erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the district courts order granting summary judgment.
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Appellants contend that they are entitled to a judgment in their favor on remand. Respondent counters that the parties on remand should be permitted to submit briefing on issues pertaining to Fannie Maes ownership of the secured loan and appellants status as the loan servicer, as respondent “was not able to provide this evidence to the District Court because [respondent] prevailed on the statute of limitations argument.” We disagree. Simply because respondent chose not to provide such evidence in conjunction with its summary judgment motion practice does not mean that respondent was not able to provide such evidence if respondent possessed it.
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Moreover, we reject respondents argument that it should be permitted to submit briefing on remand regarding the potential relevance of the United States Supreme Courts opinion in Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). Respondent has not identified any place in the district court record wherein respondent previously raised any Collins-related issues, despite respondent having had the opportunity to make arguments similar to those asserted by the plaintiffs in Collins. Cf. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (arguments raised for the first time on appeal need not be considered); NRAP 28(a)(10), (b) (requiring appellate briefs to cite to portions of the record on which the party is relying). Accordingly, we conclude that on remand, appellants are entitled to a judgment in their favor without the need for additional briefing. We therefore
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
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FOOTNOTES
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. In light of our reversal of this order, the parties arguments regarding the district courts denial of appellants NRCP 59(e) motion are moot.
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. Respondent does not dispute that the original district court judge granted respondent an NRCP 56(d) continuance to conduct discovery into similar issues.
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. The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.