MEMORANDUM **
In a civil enforcement action, a California court ordered Zulmai Nazarzai to turn over money and financial records. After Nazarzai failed to comply with the courts turn-over order, the court found him to be in contempt. Pursuant to the state courts civil contempt order, Nazarzai was detained for six years in the Orange County jail. Following his release, Mr. Nazarzai filed this action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000cc. After a bench trial, the district court found that Nazarzai was not entitled to money damages from any Defendant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Nazarzai argues that he sufficiently stated a Section 1983 claim.
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In support of that claim, he argues that his prolonged detention violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that California Penal Code § 19.2 limited his civil confinement to a year, and that Sheriff-Coroner Sandra Hutchens (in her individual capacity) and the Orange County Sheriff-Coroner Department (“OCSD”) detained him unconstitutionally.
The claim against Sheriff Hutchens fails because “prison officials charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders.” See Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2013).
The claim against OCSD also fails. Even assuming that a county can be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), (1) for violations of state law made (2) while obeying a facially valid state court order, Penal Code § 19.2 did not limit his California Code of Civil Procedure § 1219 confinement to a year. See In re Nolan W., 45 Cal.4th 1217, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 203 P.3d 454, 466 (2009) (interpreting § 1219 as authorizing an indefinite period of incarceration to coerce compliance with a court order).
2. Nazarzai also argues that the conditions of his confinement violated his constitutional rights. He contends that he was denied the right to freely practice his religion, his right to participate in physical exercise, and his right to access the day room.
“[R]easonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). But, Nazarzai was provided access to religious services and a religious advisor; he was also able to pray daily. Cf. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding consistent denial of access to chapel and religious advisors support finding of constitutional violation).
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that pre-trial detainees (and by extension civil detainees) not be denied adequate opportunities for exercise without legitimate governmental objectives. See Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1211–12. The record, however, shows that Nazarzais lack of physical exercise was self-imposed. This claim therefore fails. Nazarzais own testimony reveals that he typically got daily access to the day room. This claim therefore fails as well.
3. Nazarzai last argues that Defendant Garcia used “threats and intimidation” to restrict his right to speech and right to file grievances. “It is well-established that, among the rights they retain, prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). But, Nazarzai failed to show that a person of ordinary firmness would have been silenced by Garcias actions, and has also failed to carry his burden of “pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.” Id. at 1271; Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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FOOTNOTES
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. Nazarzai does not raise a Section 2000cc claim on appeal, and therefore we need not address it. See Natl Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. E.P.A., 966 F.3d 893, 916 (9th Cir. 2020).
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. County Defendants’ motion to amend the caption is GRANTED. (DE 7).