SUMMARY ORDER
Juan Sampel and Jose Gonzalez appeal from the judgments of conviction entered against them following their joint trial in October 2018, in which a jury found each defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. The district court sentenced Gonzalez primarily to 262 months’ imprisonment and Sampel primarily to 360 months’ imprisonment. In his counseled appeal, Sampel challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court erroneously applied three enhancements in calculating his Guidelines sentence. In his separate pro se brief, Sampel argues that the district court miscalculated the quantity of drugs involved in his criminal conduct, and therefore wrongly determined his base offense level under the Guidelines. Gonzalez argues on appeal that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction.
I. Procedural Reasonableness of Sampels Sentence
A. Managerial Role and Use-of-Affection Enhancements
In calculating the applicable Guidelines offense level, the district court determined that Sampel was subject to a three-level aggravating role adjustment for being a “manager or supervisor” in criminal activity that “involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). “To qualify for th[is] enhancement, a defendant need only manage or supervise one other participant, and may properly be considered a manager or supervisor if he exercised some degree of control over others involved in the commission of the offense.” United States v. Pristell, 941 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2019).
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“[A] district court must make specific factual findings when enhancing a defendants sentence based on his role in the offense, as such findings are necessary for appellate review.” Id. The district court also determined that Sampel was subject to a two-level enhancement for purportedly using affection to involve his wife in the drug offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(A). We will review the application of these enhancements for clear error.
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In support of both enhancements, the district court cited testimony and evidence presented at trial that described how Miriam Sampel, Juan Sampels wife, played a role in her husbands crimes. Specifically, Juan Sampel directed a cooperating witness, Angel Ocasio, to go to Miriam Sampels insurance agency to pick up money that Juan Sampel owed him for the purchase of cocaine. The next day, Ocasio went to the insurance agency and Miriam Sampel gave him a box containing $117,000.
Juan Sampel maintains on appeal that neither the evidence cited by the district court, nor any other record evidence, establishes that he directed his wifes participation in the criminal activity or that he used affection to involve her in his crimes. We agree. Evidence that Sampel told a person to pick up money from his wife does not establish that Sampel “exercised [any] degree of control” over her, Pristell, 941 F.3d at 50, or that he in any way directed her involvement in the drug business. Likewise, this evidence does not support the conclusion that Sampel used affection to involve his wife in the crimes at issue. Simply put, more is needed. The Government fails on appeal to show that the record otherwise supports the application of these enhancements. Although the Government asserts that the district court was in the best position to make determinations based on the totality of evidence presented at trial, it fails to articulate how the facts considered by the district court provided an adequate foundation for these two enhancements, which resulted—significantly—in a five-level increase in Sampels offense level. Identifying clear error, we therefore remand Sampels case to the district court for resentencing.
B. Drug Premises Enhancement
The district court also applied a two-level enhancement on the ground that Sampel “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Overruling Sampels objection to the Probation Departments pre-sentence report (PSR), the district court concluded that Sampel used his home as a drug premises, citing the testimony presented at trial.
The record supports the district courts application of this enhancement. Sampel concedes that a search of his home resulted in the discovery of a digital scale with white powder residue, gloves, plastic bags, and a large amount of cash. When considered alongside the credible evidence that Sampel conducted at least two meetings at his home related to his drug business, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in applying the drug premises enhancement.
C. Drug Quantity Calculation
In his pro se brief, Sampel argues that the district court committed clear error in calculating the drug quantity involved in his conduct to determine his base offense level under the Guidelines. In the PSR, the Probation Department calculated Sampels base offense level to be 36, citing Ocasios testimony that he supplied Sampel with at least 150 kilograms of cocaine between 2015 and 2016. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(2) (providing a base offense level of 36 for crimes involving “[a]t least 150 KG but less than 450 KG of Cocaine”). Over Sampels objection, the district court found that the PSRs drug quantity determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Where there has been no seizure of narcotics, or where the quantity seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the Guidelines require the district court to estimate the amount of drugs involved in the offense.” United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2002). We review the district courts factual determination for clear error. See United States v. Batista, 684 F.3d 333, 344 (2d Cir. 2012).
At trial, Angel Ocasio testified that Sampel was his biggest customer and estimated that he sold Sampel between 150–175 kilograms of cocaine. Contrary to Sampels arguments on appeal, nothing in the record suggests that Ocasios testimony was facially implausible; therefore, the district court was entitled to rely on this testimony in calculating the drug quantity. See United States v. Cirineo, 60 F. Appx 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (upholding district courts drug quantity determination based on witness testimony and explaining that “[w]hen a trial judges credibility finding is based on his or her decision to credit the testimony of a witness who has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error”); see also United States v. Frazier, 805 F. Appx 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (upholding drug quantity finding where district court relied on “specific testimony from a co-conspirator”). Accordingly, we see no error in the district courts calculation of the drug quantity underlying Sampels base offense level.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Gonzalezs Conviction
Gonzalezs only argument on appeal is that he was convicted based on insufficient evidence. The Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163, 184 (2d Cir. 2020). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court considers “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original)). A conviction may be upheld based on the testimony of a single witness “so long as that testimony is not incredible on its face and is capable of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Gonzalez contends that the primary evidence against him came from the testimony of cooperating witness Angel Ocasio, and that Ocasios testimony was insufficient to support his conviction because it was “incredible on its face.” Gonzalez Br. 2. Gonzalez identifies no specific aspect of Ocasios testimony that was incredible, but challenges Ocasios credibility generally, asserting that he lacks moral character. These attacks on Ocasios character do not establish that Ocasios testimony implicating Gonzalez was “incredible on its face.” In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 112. Furthermore, in the context of sufficiency challenges, this Court has made clear that “[a]ssessments of witness credibility ․ lie solely within the province of the jury.” United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010). As the Government emphasizes in its opposition brief, these criticisms of Ocasios character were presented to the jury through the defenses cross-examination of Ocasio and in summation. Because Gonzalez fails to establish that Ocasios testimony implicating Gonzalez was incredible on its face, we conclude that his sufficiency challenge fails.
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We have considered Sampels and Gonzalezs remaining arguments on appeal and find in them no basis for reversal. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment with respect to Jose Gonzalez is AFFIRMED, and the case of Juan Sampel is REMANDED with instructions that the district court vacate the judgment against him only as to the sentence imposed, and conduct a resentencing consistent with this order.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Unless otherwise noted, in quoting caselaw and the parties’ briefs, this Order omits all alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks.
2
. It can reasonably be debated whether a clear error standard applies to our review of these enhancements. With respect to the role enhancement in particular, Sampel states that he does not challenge the district courts factual findings, but rather attacks the sufficiency of those findings as a basis for applying the enhancement. See Sampel Appellants Br. at 19 (“The problem here is not that the district courts findings of fact were unsupported but rather that these facts were insufficient to support imposition of the manager/supervisor enhancement as a matter of law.”). Under these circumstances, Sampels appeal might be understood to raise a question of law for which de novo review is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Solivan, 506 F. Appx 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (“Where the parties dispute only whether the facts, as found by the district court, warrant a leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1, we review a district courts determination de novo.”); see also United States v. Burgos, 324 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “cases in this Circuit are not wholly consistent in expressing how much deference is ‘due’ the district courts determination when reviewing the imposition of an aggravating role adjustment” and that some decisions review determinations of a defendants role de novo and others review those determinations for clear error). We need not resolve this question here, however, because the parties agree that a clear error standard applies, and the district courts application of these enhancements fails under this more exacting standard.