SUMMARY ORDER
Dewayne Richardson, pro se, brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was unlawfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted in New York state court for robbery charges that were later dismissed. The district court construed the complaint as asserting claims against three New York City (the “City”) Police Department officers and the City itself. Although the City was served with process, the individual officers were not and never appeared in this action. Following discovery, the City moved for summary judgment. Over Richardsons objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judges recommendation to grant summary judgment. Richardson now appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
We review a decision granting summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
As an initial matter, we do not consider Richardsons new arguments on appeal as to why he did not serve the individual officers because he did not make these arguments in the district court. See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 838 F.3d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 2016) (“It is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). In the Citys answer to the second amended complaint, it notified Richardson that, because he had not served the individual officers, the City was the only defendant in the case. The record also suggests that the district court informed Richardson of the service issue at an initial conference. Richardson, however, did not address the service issue in his opposition to the Citys motion for summary judgment, his objections to the magistrate judges report and recommendation, or at any other point in the district court proceedings. Accordingly, Richardson has waived his challenge to the dismissal of these claims against the individual officers for failure to serve. We affirm this dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court ․ must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.”).
We also affirm the district courts grant of summary judgment to the City. “It is well established that under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts. They are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.” Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 372 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). A local government is liable under § 1983 only if a plaintiff can show that “he suffered the denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dept, 980 F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); see also Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020).
At summary judgment, the City argued that there is an absence of evidence that any unlawful municipal policy or custom led to Richardsons arrest and prosecution. Indeed, Richardson did not allege such a policy or custom existed, and failed to counter the Citys assertion with evidence in the record. Richardsons arguments instead pertained to the individual officers’ conduct and the circumstances of his arrest. In his brief to this Court, Richardson also does not argue that the City had an unlawful policy or custom. Because the City cannot be vicariously liable for the individual officers’ actions, but only for its own unlawful policy or custom, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the City.
We have considered Richardsons remaining arguments on appeal and find in them no basis for reversal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.