ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Joe H. Lucero Jr., proceeding pro se, sued HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC Bank”) in state court. HSBC Bank removed the suit to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and then moved to dismiss the complaint. Mr. Lucero, however, did not respond to HSBC Banks motion. Pursuant to its local rule, the district court considered the failure to respond as consent to grant the motion. It therefore granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
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we affirm.
Mr. Luceros opening brief discusses various grievances against HSBC Bank and other persons involved in foreclosing on his house. But the brief does not address his failure to respond to the motion to dismiss or otherwise argue how the district court was wrong to grant the motion and close the case. We read the filings of pro se parties liberally. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). However, we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigants attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id. An appellant must attack the district courts reasons for its decisions, and advancing other contentions “will not help the appellant if the reasons that were given by the district court go unchallenged.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). While “[r]ecitation of a tale of apparent injustice may assist in [challenging the district courts decision], ․ it cannot substitute for legal argument.” Id. Because Mr. Luceros opening brief fails to address the district courts reasoning, we affirm the dismissal of the case. See id. at 1366, 1369; Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841.
HSBC Banks motion to take judicial notice is denied as moot. The district courts judgment is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Although the dismissal was without prejudice, the decision is reviewable under § 1291 because the district courts order dismissed the case, not just the complaint. See Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “a dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final” (internal quotation marks omitted)).Moreover, Mr. Luceros notice of appeal was timely, even though it was filed 61 days after the decision, because the district court never entered a separate judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) (providing that when the district court does not enter a separate Rule 58 judgment, judgment is deemed entered 150 days after entry of the order appealed from); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2) (same).
Carolyn B. McHugh, Circuit Judge