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SINGH v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.2021-05-12No. 19-1807

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Daler Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a June 6, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a January 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singhs application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Daler Singh, No. A206 086 480 (B.I.A. June 6, 2019), affg No. A206 086 480 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 9, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJs and the BIAs opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․, the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ․ without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer ․ to an IJs credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agencys determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim that individuals, who were Jat Sikhs, attacked him in India on account of his membership in the Dera Sacha Sauda.

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singhs account of his alleged June 2013 attack and the accounts provided in the affidavits from family and neighbors that he submitted to corroborate his claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”). Singh testified that he and his attackers were on foot, while the five affiants stated that his attackers drove a van into Singh while he was riding a motorcycle. Singh initially could not explain this inconsistency, but later asserted first that the affiants were not educated and then that the affiants had members of his attackers’ ethnic group prepare the affidavits for them. The agency was not compelled to credit Singhs evolving explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Having questioned Singhs credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). The agency reasonably declined to credit the affidavits from Singhs family and neighbors in any respect because, in addition to the significant inconsistency discussed above, the affidavits were almost identical in their descriptions of the June 2013 attack and his wifes and neighbors’ affidavits were identical (including grammatical errors) in describing his alleged October 2013 attack. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has ․ firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that the statements are ‘canned.’ ”). Further, Singh did not submit any evidence of his injuries, such as medical records or photographs, and the letter from Dera Sacha Sauda does not mention his alleged attacks. The agency was not compelled to conclude that general evidence of tensions and clashes between Sikhs and Dera Sacha Sauda members rehabilitated Singhs credibility regarding his own alleged attacks.

Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the agencys adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of asylum (including humanitarian asylum), withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.