SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Jay Bradshaw, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from a judgment of the district court, entered December 12, 2019, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant prison officials and municipal entities on all claims. Bradshaw argues on appeal that the court erred when granting summary judgment on his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims because there were genuine disputes of material fact from which a jury could have found that correctional guards, acting in accordance with official policy, used excessive force against him, and that medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his injuries. He also argues that the court erred when denying him additional discovery and appointed counsel. We assume the readers familiarity with the record.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013). We review decisions to limit discovery and denials of requests for appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008) (discovery rulings); Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (appointment of counsel).
I. Two of Bradshaws three excessive force claims fail.
Bradshaws amended complaint alleges that two correctional officers—Jason Loesch and Scott Tebbens—used excessive force when they tackled and restrained him for refusing to comply with an order, when Loesch punched him in the face, and when Tebbens broke his finger after he had been restrained. We analyze Bradshaws claims in that order, and we hold that the district court erred only when granting summary judgment on his claim against Tebbens.
To state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must allege “that the defendant acted with a subjectively sufficiently culpable state of mind” and “that the conduct was objectively harmful enough or sufficiently serious to reach constitutional dimensions.” Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As to the subjective component, a court considers “the extent of the injury and the mental state of the defendant, as well as the need for the application of force; the correlation between that need and the amount of force used; the threat reasonably perceived by the defendants; and any efforts made by the defendants to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Bradshaw clearly failed to prove the culpability of Loeschs and Tebbenss states of mind when they tackled and restrained him. It is uncontroverted that Bradshaw refused to interlace his fingers behind his head when Loesch ordered him to do so, and the split-second decision to bring Bradshaw to the ground and subdue him to eliminate the security risk that the officers believed he posed was not excessive. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Bradshaws excessive force claim as it relates to the initial tackle.
As to Bradshaws other claims of excessive force, Bradshaws sworn testimony sharply conflicts with that of the officer defendants. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that “Mr. Bradshaw fails to point to any evidence in support of his claims beyond his own deposition testimony – which alone cannot withstand a summary judgment motion.” Appx at 19. That is not accurate as a general statement of the law. A single witnesss sworn testimony, if believed by a jury, can support a verdict, and is enough to raise a genuine issue of fact precluding summary judgment. See Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 78 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Owens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the defendants contention that the plaintiffs proffered testimony “is uncorroborated and not credible is a jury argument inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment”). Where, however, “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The defendants argue that such is the case here, because Bradshaws version of events is contradicted by video and medical evidence.
That standard is satisfied as to Bradshaws claim that Loesch used excessive force by punching him in the face after he was on the ground, subdued and handcuffed. That claim fails in light of the contradictory video and medical evidence. See Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2005). Bradshaw alleged and testified that Loesch punched him after he was handcuffed, but the video footage of the event conclusively shows that Loesch did not punch him, such that there is no genuine issue of material fact in this regard. Medical records also undermine Bradshaws allegation that Loesch punched him on the left side of his face, as the records show that he sustained a bruise on the right side of his face.
The district court erred, however, when granting summary judgment on Bradshaws claim that Tebbens used excessive force and broke his finger. Although the medical evidence showed that Bradshaws finger was not actually broken, Bradshaw also testified that Tebbens threatened to break his finger, and then twisted and bent it painfully. Bradshaws and Tebbenss hands are obscured during portions of the video submitted by defendants. Accordingly, we cannot say with the requisite degree of certainty that Bradshaws factual assertion is, as a matter of law, something that no rational jury could accept. Thus, we vacate this portion of the district courts judgment.
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II. Bradshaws deliberate indifference claim fails.
Bradshaws Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs also fails, because he cannot show that (1) his medical condition was objectively serious (the objective test); and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs (the subjective test). See Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). The objective test requires a showing that: (a) prison staff did not act “reasonably” in response to the inmates health risk, Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)), and (b) the condition complained of is “sufficiently serious,” id. at 280. In determining whether a condition is sufficiently serious, courts consider “whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find it important and worthy of comment,” “whether the condition significantly affects an individuals daily activities,” and “whether [the condition] causes chronic and substantial pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
We find that the prison staff acted reasonably when treating Bradshaw. Medical professionals treated him for his injuries on the day he sustained them, and again more than a dozen times after that. While Bradshaw was not sent to an orthopedist despite multiple rescheduled appointments for this purpose, he has not shown that this was unreasonable, given that his finger suffered only a contusion and not a new fracture. Moreover, there is no evidence that the contusion significantly affected his daily activities. Id. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when denying Bradshaw additional discovery or appointed counsel.
We detect no abuse of discretion in the district courts denial of Bradshaws motion to appoint counsel based on its conclusion, on the record before it, that Bradshaw probably would not prevail in this action. A court may appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), but the plaintiff must first demonstrate some likelihood of merit. See Smith v. Fischer, 803 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2015); Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1989). Now that Bradshaws claim against Tebbens has survived a motion for summary judgment, we express no view as to the potential merit of any renewed application for appointed counsel. Any such renewed motion is confided to the district courts wise discretion.
With respect to Bradshaws request for additional discovery to identify the John Doe officers named in his amended complaint, a district court “abuses its discretion only ‘when the discovery is so limited as to affect a partys substantial rights.’ ” In re “Agent Orange”, 517 F.3d at 103 (quoting Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985)). Since identifying the John Doe officers would not have helped Bradshaw establish that he had suffered a constitutional deprivation and would not have otherwise advanced his deliberate indifference claims, the district courts decision did not affect his substantial rights. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion.
We have considered all of Bradshaws remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all respects excepting its judgment on the excessive force claim against Tebbens, which we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.
FOOTNOTES
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. Bradshaw does not appeal the dismissal of his state law claims, so we do not reach those claims.
2
. Bradshaw also alleged Monell claims against municipal entities. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To the extent Bradshaws excessive force and deliberate indifference claims fail, his related Monell claims against the municipal defendants also fail. A Monell claim based on Bradshaws surviving excessive use of force claim fails because Bradshaw has not put forward evidence—apart from a list of court cases—to support his conclusory allegation that the alleged finger twisting was pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.