MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Buchanan, J.), entered December 7, 2020 in Schenectady County, which granted petitioners application pursuant to CPLR 7503 to permanently stay arbitration between the parties.
On May 25, 2019, respondent Isaiah M. Nichols was involved in a motor vehicle accident with vehicles operated by respondents Noorullah Osmani and Sarah E. Florkiewicz. At the time of the accident, Nichols was the assistant manager of Monroe Muffler Brake, Inc. and was operating a truck owned by Monro. The accident took place outside of regular business hours, and Nichols did not have the express permission of Monro to operate the truck at that time or place, nor did Nichols carry his own policy of auto insurance. Monros insurer for the truck, respondent Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (hereinafter Travelers), disclaimed insurance coverage for any claims that would be brought against Nichols, stating that he did not have Monros permission to operate the truck at the time of the accident, and denied any liability on the part of Monro. Florkiewicz then brought an uninsured motorist claim against petitioner, her insurance carrier, which then commenced this proceeding to stay any uninsured motorist arbitration, objecting to Travelers’ disclaimer of coverage. All parties except Nichols entered into a stipulation to submit to a framed issue hearing regarding permissive use of the truck. After such hearing, Supreme Court granted petitioners application, finding that Nichols had implied permissive use of the truck under the presumption of consent set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, such presumption had not been rebutted and, therefore, the truck was insured under Monros policy with Travelers. Travelers and Monro (hereinafter collectively referred to as respondents) appeal. We reverse.
Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1), the negligence of the operator of a motor vehicle may be imputed to the owner of the vehicle who “operat[ed] the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner” (see Williams v. J. Luke Constr. Co. LLC, 172 A.D.3d 1509, 1510, 99 N.Y.S.3d 460 [2019]; Britt v. Pharmacologic PET Servs., Inc., 36 A.D.3d 1039, 1039–1040, 828 N.Y.S.2d 630 [2007], lv dismissed 9 N.Y.3d 831, 840 N.Y.S.2d 563, 872 N.E.2d 249 [2007]; Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 205 A.D.2d 857, 858, 613 N.Y.S.2d 295 [1994], lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 807, 621 N.Y.S.2d 516, 645 N.E.2d 1216 [1994]). The statute “creates a presumption that the vehicle is being operated with the owners consent, but the presumption may be rebutted by substantial evidence showing that the operation was without permission” (Williams v. J. Luke Constr. Co., 172 A.D.3d at 1510–1511, 99 N.Y.S.3d 460 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Britt v. Pharmacologic PET Services, Inc., 36 A.D.3d at 1040, 828 N.Y.S.2d 630; see New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 A.D.2d 449, 450, 761 N.Y.S.2d 730 [2003]).
We find that respondents rebutted the presumption of permissive use. Michael Kio, Monros store manager and Nichols’ superior, testified that he advised Nichols on more than one occasion of the companys longstanding policy proscribing an employees personal use of company vehicles, including the truck. Nichols acknowledged to Kio that he was aware and understood this policy and that he did not have permission to operate the truck for personal use or use outside of business hours, and that it was to be used for store business only. As Nichols stated in his written submission to Supreme Court, “I knew I was not supposed to be driving the company truck off company time.” The statements of Kio and Nichols regarding company policy and their understanding of that policy proscribing personal use stand uncontradicted. “Uncontradicted statements by both the vehicles owner and its driver that the driver was operating the vehicle without the owners permission will constitute substantial evidence that rebuts the presumption” (Britt v. Pharmacologic PET Servs., Inc., 36 A.D.3d at 1040, 828 N.Y.S.2d 630 [citation omitted]; see Country–Wide Ins. Co. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 6 N.Y.3d 172, 177–178, 811 N.Y.S.2d 302, 844 N.E.2d 756 [2006]; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sajewski, 150 A.D.3d 1297, 1298, 56 N.Y.S.3d 204 [2017]).
Here, Kio went a step further and took steps to prevent permissive use by reiterating to Nichols that he could not use the truck for personal use, after hours, and, at one point, removing the fuel pump fuse to the truck, which rendered it inoperable for a time. Petitioner claims in opposition to respondents’ evidence that Kios testimony that he had suspected that Nichols may have used the truck outside of business hours and that Nichols likely replaced the fuel pump fuse gives credence to the suspicion of personal use. However, said contention is mere supposition, at best. Kio emphasized that he never actually saw Nichols driving the vehicle other than on company business. With respect to the basis for Kios prior suspicions – i.e., his observation, when he arrived in the morning, that the truck was in Monros parking lot outside of the garage where it was stored overnight – Nichols had a business reason to so move the truck. Moreover, such use is a far cry from Nichols’ driving the truck after business hours and miles from the Monro store, as he did on the night of the accident. In our view, such mere suspicion is insufficient to overcome the evidence presented through Kios and Nichols’ unrefuted testimony negating the presumption of permissive use. In short, respondents adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Monro, through Kio, did not expressly or impliedly consent to Nichols after hours and personal use of the truck and thus they overcame the presumption of consent to operate. Accordingly, there is a valid uninsured motorist claim and Supreme Court should have denied petitioners application to stay arbitration.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and application denied.
Colangelo, J.
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.