SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Wilder Cruz, a citizen of Bolivia, seeks review of the BIAs March and December 2019 decisions denying his application for cancellation of removal. In re Wilder Cruz, No. A 077 942 534 (B.I.A. Dec. 13, 2019); In re Wilder Cruz, No. A 077 942 534 (B.I.A. Mar. 29, 2019). On appeal, Cruz raises three arguments regarding the BIAs March 2019 decision: first, the BIA erroneously applied a de novo standard of review when it overturned findings of fact of the immigration judge (IJ) regarding the nature of Cruzs conviction for reckless assault of a child; second, the BIA erroneously overturned the IJs credibility determination without establishing that the IJ clearly erred; and third, the BIA did not properly consider and weigh all of the evidence in the record. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to dismiss Cruzs petition.
Our jurisdiction to review the BIAs discretionary denial of cancellation of removal is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). A question of law may arise where the BIA overlooked or mischaracterized evidence, see Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009), considered a prohibited factor, see Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2010), or abused its discretion by failing to provide a rational justification or by applying the wrong legal standard, see Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39. But a petitioner cannot “us[e] the rhetoric of a ‘constitutional claim’ or ‘question of law’ to disguise what is essentially a quarrel about fact-finding or the exercise of discretion.” Id.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Cruzs arguments that the BIA applied the wrong legal standards upon reviewing the IJs decision do not raise genuine legal questions. The BIA did not subject the IJs fact-finding to de novo review. It reevaluated the record created by the IJ regarding Cruzs conviction for reckless assault of a child and his inconsistent statements about the assault and came to a different conclusion about discretionary relief than the IJ, as it was permitted to do. Thus, Cruz raises “a quarrel about fact-finding or the exercise of discretion” that we have no jurisdiction to review. Id. at 39.
Even if we had jurisdiction to consider these arguments, we would reject them for the same reason. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (providing that “[t]he Board may review questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration judges de novo”); see, e.g., Khan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
To the extent that Cruz claims that the BIA erred in its discretionary choices — including in its decision to cite to the text of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.02 in discussing the seriousness of the offense — we lack jurisdiction over that argument. See, e.g., Noble v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 73, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Because we conclude that the BIA did not reject a finding of fact by the IJ that [petitioner] was rehabilitated, but instead evaluated the nature and extent of the rehabilitation as one equity among many in exercising its discretion, we conclude that the petitioner is, in substance, asking us to [impermissibly] review an exercise of discretion by the BIA.”).
Cruz also argues that the BIA ignored evidence of the victims recovery and harm that Cruz may suffer in Bolivia. We are not persuaded that the BIA erroneously ignored evidence. Although the BIA did not explicitly reference a medical report regarding the victims recovery, it acknowledged the recovery and referenced the page of the IJs decision discussing the report. It then concluded that the victims recovery did not render the offense less serious. We are not free to reject this conclusion. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not demand that the BIA expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” (quotation marks omitted)); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”). As for Cruzs claim that the BIA failed to consider evidence that he would suffer harm in Bolivia, he failed to exhaust this issue before the agency. Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119–20, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that issue exhaustion is generally mandatory and indicating that one purpose of exhaustion requirement is to give BIA opportunity to correct any errors).
We have considered Cruzs remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.