SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Paul Andre Jude Mariano Garcia, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, seeks review of an August 1, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a February 22, 2019 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), ordering his removal and denying his application for cancellation of removal. In re Paul Andre Jude Mariano Garcia, No. A XXX XX9 752 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2019), affg No. A XXX XX9 752 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Feb. 22, 2019). We have reviewed both the IJs and the BIAs opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
At the outset, we reject Garcias argument that the agency lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his initial notice to appear (“NTA”) did not include a hearing date or time. In Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2019), we held that “an NTA that omits information regarding the time and date of the initial removal hearing is nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction in the Immigration Court, at least so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien,” id. at 112. Garcia received a subsequent notice of hearing specifying the date and time and he appeared at the hearing as directed. As a result, the agency properly had jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.
Removability
Garcia challenges the agencys conclusion that he was removable for violating a protective order under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). That subsection provides,
[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Garcia argues that the BIA erred in not applying the traditional categorical approach to determine whether his state offense matched the ground of removal in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). See Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986, 192 L.Ed.2d 60 (2015) (“The categorical approach historically taken in determining whether a state conviction renders an alien removable ․ looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction․”). Instead, following the BIAs own precedent, the BIA considered “probative and reliable evidence regarding what a State court has determined about the aliens violation” in determining the applicability of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Matter of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173, 176–77 (BIA 2017); see also Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 399, 401 (BIA 2018).
This Court has not determined whether § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) is subject to the categorical approach or to a circumstance-specific analysis. The wording of the provision, however, supports the latter, because it requires that the agency or reviewing court assess the “conduct” of the individual rather than the type of conviction. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (holding that a statute requires “a circumstance-specific approach” where it refers to “conduct involved ‘in’ the commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense”); Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 841 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]hether the alien has been ‘convicted’ is not the critical question of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).”). Cf. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986 (noting that the categorial approach is appropriate where the “conviction, not conduct, [is] the trigger for immigration consequences”).
In light of this, we find no error in the agencys determination that Garcia is removable. The transcript of Garcias plea hearing in state court makes clear that he repeatedly harassed a protected person in violation of a protective order in effect against him. Accordingly, his violation triggers removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
Cancellation of Removal
Garcia challenges the agencys denial of the discretionary relief of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. In reviewing a matter of discretionary relief, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D), which include “the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts,” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067, 206 L.Ed.2d 271 (2020). See also Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2008). Where a petition “merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual findings or justification for the discretionary choices, ․ the court ․ lack[s] jurisdiction” over the petition for review. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006). Garcia raises neither constitutional claims nor questions of law over which we have jurisdiction.
Garcias arguments all pertain to how the IJ balanced the evidence in reaching its decision. These aspects of the IJs decision are beyond our review. See Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that it is an “unreviewable argument that the IJ balanced improperly those factors that the IJ could consider”).
To begin, Garcia argues that the IJ failed to consider evidence of his positive equities. Even if we could consider this argument, we note that it does not accurately describe the record. The IJ expressly “balance[d] the respondents equities against the adverse factors.” Cert. Admin. R. at 137.
Garcia further charges that the IJ committed factual error by finding that the petitioner did not show rehabilitation and committed legal error by requiring that he demonstrate such rehabilitation. Again, however, we cannot consider the petitioners former argument. The latter argument is belied by the record, which shows that the IJ did not impose such a requirement. Rather, the IJ merely considered lack of rehabilitation as one of several factors relevant to its discretionary analysis. See In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (noting that an IJ has broad discretion in what adverse qualities to consider in determining cancellation of removal).
Finally, Garcia argues that the IJ did not properly credit evidence that he would face discrimination based on his sexual orientation if he is returned to Trinidad and Tobago. In support, he points to the IJs statement that, although it “did not find any evidence of harm to deportees, ․ [Garcia] may certainly face discrimination” upon his return. Cert. Admin. R. at 150. This argument too asks that we reassess the weight that the IJ assigned to particular evidence, a review that we are not authorized to conduct. See Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39-40; see also Argueta, 617 F.3d at 112–13; Carcamo v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
Due Process Claim
We reject Garcias final argument that he was denied a full and fair hearing at the agency in violation of due process. To establish such a violation, “an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims or that [she was] otherwise deprived ․ of fundamental fairness.” Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Garcia contends that the IJs demeanor and questioning style during his hearing revealed the IJs predisposition to rule against Garcia. He also contends that the IJ did not meaningfully review the evidence.
Upon review, we conclude that the record does not support these characterizations and that the IJs questioning and consideration of evidence did not violate due process.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.