AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Weng Jia-Tao, a native and citizen of the Peoples Republic of China, seeks review of a May 28, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a January 10, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jia-Taos application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Weng Jia-Tao, No. A206 429 050 (B.I.A. May 28, 2019), affg No. A206 429 050 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 10, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJs and the BIAs opinions under the substantial evidence standard. See Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․, the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ․ without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer ․ to an IJs credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agencys determination that Jia-Tao was not credible as to his claim that police detained and beat him for practicing Christianity.
The IJ reasonably relied on Jia-Taos inconsistent statements about how many times he was arrested. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Jia-Taos statements throughout the proceedings varied as to whether he was arrested once or twice. This inconsistency provides substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination because it relates to the sole allegation of past persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “material inconsistency in an aspect of ․ [applicants] story that served as an example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum ․ afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The agency was not required to credit Jia-Taos retractions of the inconsistent statements as they did not resolve the inconsistency, which was repeated throughout the proceedings. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by a second inconsistency: his and his wifes written statements reflected that they began considering him leaving China before his arrest, but he testified and confirmed that they did not discuss him leaving until after his arrest. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”). The IJ was justified in rejecting Jia-Taos varied explanations for this inconsistency. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive because asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.