DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover on an account stated, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Catherine M. Bartlett, J.), dated January 22, 2018. The order granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint and, sua sponte, struck the defendants answer, her opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and her cross motion, among other things, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that on the Courts own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order as, sua sponte, struck the defendants answer, her opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and her cross motion, inter alia, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order (see CPLR 5701[c]), and leave to appeal is granted; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, to provide the defendant with an opportunity to serve and file an answer, opposition to the plaintiffs motion, and papers in support of her cross motion which do not violate Judiciary Law § 478, and thereafter for further proceedings, including a new determination of the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint.
The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover on an account stated, alleging that the defendant failed to pay sums due on her credit card account. Following service of the summons and complaint, the defendants husband, James W. Gilliam II (hereinafter Gilliam), purportedly in his capacity as the defendants attorney-in-fact by short form power of attorney, in accordance with New York General Obligations Law §§ 5–1502A–N, filed with the court an answer and certain cross claims on behalf of the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the complaint. The defendant, again purportedly represented by Gilliam, opposed the plaintiffs motion and cross-moved, among other things, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In an order dated January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, struck the defendants answer, opposition to the plaintiffs motion, and cross motion, and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint. The defendant appeals.
Contrary to the defendants contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that Gilliams submissions to the court violated Judiciary Law § 478 (see Whitehead v. Town House Equities, Ltd., 8 A.D.3d 369, 370–371, 777 N.Y.S.2d 917). “New York law prohibits the practice of law in this State on behalf of anyone other than himself or herself by a person who is not an admitted member of the Bar, regardless of the authority purportedly conferred by execution of a power of attorney” (People ex rel. Field on Behalf of Field v. Cronshaw, 138 A.D.2d 765, 765, 526 N.Y.S.2d 579). The designation as an attorney-in-fact under General Obligations Law §§ 5–1502A–N does not confer upon a designated agent the right to provide representation as an attorney-at-law, and “cannot be read to displace the provisions of Judiciary Law § 478” (Whitehead v. Town House Equities, Ltd., 8 A.D.3d at 370, 777 N.Y.S.2d 917). Nor do any of the exceptions to Judiciary Law § 478 apply, notwithstanding Gilliams claim to be pursuing a law degree (see Judiciary Law § 478[2], [3]). Further, Gilliams marriage to the defendant did not permit him to appear pro se on her behalf (see People ex rel. Field on Behalf of Field v. Cronshaw, 138 A.D.2d at 765, 526 N.Y.S.2d 579; Smolenski v. T.G.I. Fridays, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 792, 794, 834 N.Y.S.2d 436; see also Abraham v. American Gardens Co., 189 A.D.3d 741, 745, 136 N.Y.S.3d 148). Accordingly, the court did not err in striking the defendants answer, opposition to the plaintiffs motion, and cross motion as an appropriate sanction for the unauthorized practice of law (see Whitehead v. Town House Equities, Ltd., 8 A.D.3d at 371, 777 N.Y.S.2d 917).
However, under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court should not have proceeded to adjudicate the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment without first permitting the defendant the opportunity to appear and participate in the action, either pro se, or with appropriate counsel (see generally Arrowhead Capital Fin., Ltd. v. Cheyne Specialty Fin. Fund L.P., 32 N.Y.3d 645, 650, 95 N.Y.S.3d 128, 119 N.E.3d 768; Salt Aire Trading LLC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, 93 A.D.3d 452, 453, 940 N.Y.S.2d 222). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Orange County, to provide the defendant with an opportunity to serve and file an answer, opposition to the plaintiffs motion, and papers in support of her cross motion which do not violate Judiciary Law § 478, and thereafter for further proceedings, including a new determination of the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint.
The parties’ remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.
CHAMBERS, J.P., CONNOLLY, ZAYAS and DOWLING, JJ., concur.