¶ 1 Plaintiff James Lomick appeals from an order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission vacating an order of Deputy Commissioner Kevin Howell and remanding the case for a full evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we dismiss Plaintiffs appeal as interlocutory.
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶ 2 On 19 April 2017, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint with the Commission against Defendant North Carolina Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). On 18 January 2019, an order was filed by Deputy Commissioner Kevin Howell for Entry of Default in favor of Plaintiff. DPS then appealed Deputy Commissioner Howells order to the full Industrial Commission. On 23 April 2020, the Commission vacated the order of Deputy Commissioner Howell and remanded the matter for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits.
¶ 3 Plaintiff filed written notice of appeal from the Commissions order on 22 May 2020. DPS subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs appeal as interlocutory.
II. Analysis
¶ 4 Plaintiff argues on appeal that the Commissions order is not interlocutory. Plaintiff contends “[t]he order did not just resolve some of the issues between the parties—it resolved them all.” We disagree.
¶ 5 “An appeal does not lie from an interlocutory order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission.” Brown v. Booker, 121 N.C. App. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1996). “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). “A decision that on its face contemplates further proceedings or ․ does not fully dispose of the pending stage of the litigation is interlocutory.” Perry v. N.C. Dept of Corr., 176 N.C. App. 123, 129, 625 S.E.2d 790, 794 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “An order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory as ‘it does not finally dispose of the case and requires further action by the trial court.’ ” Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 477, 363 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1988) (quoting Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 209, 270 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1980)).
¶ 6 The Commissions 23 April 2020 order vacated Deputy Commissioner Howells Entry of Default and remanded the matter for a full evidentiary hearing. “Because the Full Commission set aside the default judgment, the instant action has not been disposed of and requires further action, that is, a hearing on the merits of the case.” Brown, 121 N.C. App. at 368, 465 S.E.2d at 76.
¶ 7 Plaintiff additionally has failed to argue that the Commissions order affects any substantial right warranting immediate review of his appeal. See Cash v. Lincare Holdings, 181 N.C. App. 259, 263, 639 S.E.2d 9, 10 (2007) (“Even where a decision is interlocutory, however, immediate review of the issue is proper where the interlocutory decision affects a substantial right.”). “[T]he appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994).
¶ 8 Because Plaintiffs appeal is interlocutory and Plaintiff provides no argument supporting immediate review of his appeal, we grant DPSs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs appeal.
III. Conclusion
¶ 9 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Plaintiffs appeal as interlocutory.
DISMISSED.
Report per Rule 30(e).
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Chief Judge STROUD and Judge HAMPSON concur.