KAMAL v. Donna Fields Goldstein, Individual capacity; et al., Defendants. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-09-23No. No. 20-55065

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment dismissing Kamal's complaint was affirmed because he failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under the applicable legal standards.

Karim Christian Kamal appealed the dismissal of his federal civil rights and racketeering claims against Donna Fields Goldstein and others. The district court dismissed the action under the pleading standards that require a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal without deference to the district court's legal conclusions and found no error in the lower court's decision.

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal because Kamal's complaint failed to meet the threshold pleading requirements. The opinion notes that Kamal did not adequately allege the elements necessary to support either his constitutional violation claim or his RICO claim, and that he did not raise specific legal arguments on appeal to overcome the dismissal.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the complaint stated a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Whether the complaint adequately alleged elements of a RICO violation
Pleading standards for stating a claim for relief

Procedural posture

Kamal appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his § 1983 and RICO action under Rule 12(b)(6).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Karim Christian Kamal appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kamals action because Kamal failed to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Eclectic Props. E, LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating the elements of a RICO claim); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”); Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiffs protected status.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.