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LIN v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.2021-07-09No. 19-673

Summary

Holding. The petition for review is denied because the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination was reasonable and supported by the record.

Lin Hang Bin, a Chinese national, petitioned for review of decisions denying his asylum claim, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. His sole basis for asylum was alleged persecution on account of his Christian religious practice in China. The immigration judge found Lin's testimony not credible and denied relief; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lin challenged only the credibility finding on appeal.

The court reviewed the immigration judge's credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard, according substantial deference to the judge's assessment. The court found multiple significant inconsistencies in Lin's account of his Christian practice. His written statement indicated that a friend named Jianping first introduced him to an illegal underground church, but at his hearing Lin testified that Jianping had actually introduced him to a formal church, and that a different person named Chen Hao brought him to the illegal church. Lin also failed to disclose his participation in the formal church in his written statement and gave inaccurate testimony when questioned about these omissions. Additionally, the immigration judge observed that Lin appeared to have memorized general aspects of his claim but could not provide specific details about critical events.

The court concluded the immigration judge's adverse credibility finding was supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. The discrepancies were not minor collateral matters but went to the core decision of Lin's involvement with the illegal church, which was central to his persecution claim. The immigration judge properly considered the totality of circumstances, including demeanor, consistency of statements, and internal plausibility.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Weight of credibility determinations in asylum proceedings and standard of appellate review
  • Treatment of discrepancies in applicant testimony regarding religious practice and church attendance
  • Whether collateral inconsistencies may cumulatively undermine credibility in asylum claims

Procedural posture

Petitioner sought review of Board of Immigration Appeals affirmance of an immigration judge's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Lin Hang Bin, a native and citizen of the Peoples Republic of China, seeks review of a 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a 2017 decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Lin Hang Bin, No. A XXX XX8 272 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 2019), affg No. A XXX XX8 272 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Nov. 22, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition.

We have reviewed both the IJs and the BIAs opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). In denying asylum, the IJ concluded that Lin did not carry his burden of proof because his testimony was not credible and he did not otherwise proffer sufficient evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“In determining whether the applicant has met the applicants burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record.”). Lin challenges in this petition only the adverse credibility determination. See Pet. Br. at 6.

We review this determination for substantial evidence, “which requires that [a determination] be supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record when considered as a whole.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We defer to an IJs credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (An IJs “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”).

An IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on the “the totality of the circumstances” and “all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). They include:

․ the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicants or witnesss account, the consistency between the applicants or witnesss written and oral statements ․ , the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicants claim, or any other relevant factor.

Id. “Even where the agency relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential” to adverse credibility. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We deny the petition for review because the IJs adverse credibility determination was reasonable and supported by the record. See id. at 76; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Among other things, the IJ relied on discrepancies in Lins account of his Christian practice in China, the sole basis for his asylum claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (providing that applicants may be granted asylum if “[their] religion ․ was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant[s]”). In Lins written statement, he described “contact[ing] the [Christian] church for the first time” “[i]n February 2015.” Cert. Admin. R. (“CAR”) at 191. At that time, as Lin wrote, his friend Lin Jianping (“Jianping”) “led” him to an “underground” illegal church in China. CAR at 191. On his third visit to this church, seven months later in September 2015, Lin was arrested in a police raid and detained for fifteen days. CAR at 191-92.

As Lin admitted at his asylum hearing, this written statement contains numerous discrepancies. Although the written statement implies that Lins three visits to the illegal church were his primary experience of Christianity, Lin testified that he had belonged to a “formal church” in China as well. CAR at 44. As the IJ explained, citing a 2016 State Department report on China, “millions of Chinese citizens ․ practic[e] Christianity” openly at such churches. CAR at 50. When the IJ asked Lin why he had not disclosed this experience before, Lin inaccurately testified that he had. CAR at 44.

Furthermore, Lin admitted at the hearing that Jianping did not in fact introduce him to the illegal church, but to the formal church. CAR at 45; see Pet. Br. at 17-18 (conceding that Lins written account about Jianpings role was wrong). Lin instead testified that an individual named Chen Hao brought him to the illegal church. CAR at 45. When the IJ asked Lin why he had never mentioned Chen Hao before, Lin testified inaccurately that he had referred to Chen Hao namelessly as a “church brother” in his written statement. CAR at 45. But the written statement attributes Lins introduction to the illegal church only to Jianping. CAR at 191.

The IJ reasonably determined that the shifting nature of Lins account and his inaccurate testimony to explain these discrepancies undercut his credibility. Although Lin argues the discrepancies concern small details, an IJ is entitled to consider discrepancies “without regard to whether [they] go[ ] to the heart of the applicants claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). In any case, we consider significant that the discrepancies pertain to the consequential, dangerous, and presumably memorable decision by Lin to join the illegal church from the formal church. In this context, the IJ reasonably could find that such discrepancies reflected adversely on Lins credibility, rather than were just inadvertent or immaterial.

We also credit the IJs direct observations of Lins demeanor, candor, and responsiveness. See id. The IJ observed that Lin was “unable to provide detail” about the critical events at issue. CAR at 45. Lin seemed to “use[ ] the same terminology” to answer different questions as though he “had committed to memory the general aspects of [his] claim but was not able to provide specific detail regarding the story.” CAR at 45.

In light of the totality of this record, we conclude that the IJ made a reasonable adverse credibility determination as to Lin. We have reviewed his remaining arguments and find in them no basis for granting the petition.

The petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.