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PONCE ELIAS v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-04-13No. No. 19-70808

Summary

Holding. The petition was granted and the case was remanded to the BIA for further consideration of both the withholding of removal and CAT protection claims under the correct legal standards.

A Salvadoran national sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' rejection of her applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The court identified two independent legal errors warranting reconsideration. First, the BIA improperly rejected her proposed particular social group—young women abused by their fathers in El Salvador who cannot flee due to gang targeting—by mechanically reasoning that it was defined by reference to persecution itself, without conducting the individualized case-by-case analysis required by controlling precedent. Second, the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard for her CAT claim by requiring affirmative governmental consent to torture, when the proper standard permits relief based on tacit acquiescence, willful blindness, or awareness by public officials.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a proposed particular social group defined with reference to persecution can be cognizable under asylum law
  • Whether the BIA must conduct individualized case-by-case analysis before rejecting a social group
  • The appropriate legal standard for government acquiescence under the Convention Against Torture

Procedural posture

The court reviewed the BIA's denial of petitioner's applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection pursuant to its appellate jurisdiction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying her applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition and remand to the BIA for further consideration.

1

The opening brief prepared by petitioners counsel contains several errors. Most concerning, the section of the brief addressing petitioners CAT claim appears to have been written for an unrelated case. This section of the brief refers to petitioner as “a convenience store employee [who] was robbed at gun point” and threatened with being kidnapped. These facts do not appear anywhere in the administrative record for petitioner, and the only record citation in this section refers to the record in an entirely different case. Although this error was conspicuously raised in the governments answering brief, petitioners counsel did not attempt to acknowledge, explain, or correct this oversight.

1. The BIAs conclusion that petitioners proposed particular social group was incognizable was not supported by the case-by-case analysis required by the BIAs precedents as explained in our recent decision in Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the BIA concluded petitioners proposed social group of “young women who are abused by their fathers in El Salvador and who are unable to flee because they are also targeted by the criminal gangs in El Salvador” was “not cognizable because it is defined with reference to the persecution itself.” But “the mere mention of harm does not categorically disqualify an otherwise cognizable social group.” Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1085. Rather, the BIA must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the group is “defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm.” Id. at 1086 (emphasis added) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (BIA 2014)). Because the BIA failed to conduct the required case-by-case analysis here, we remand petitioners asylum and withholding claims to the BIA for further consideration of in light of Diaz-Reynoso

2

2. The BIA applied the incorrect legal standard when it concluded petitioner was not entitled to protection under CAT. The BIA reasoned “[petitioner] ha[d] not shown that anyone in the El Salvadoran government would affirmatively consent or acquiesce to her torture” (emphasis added). This is an incorrect statement of the standard applicable to CAT claims. It is well established that the governments tacit consent or acquiescence to torture is sufficient to entitle an applicant to CAT relief. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The correct inquiry ․ is whether a respondent can show that public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture of their citizens by third parties, or as stated by the Fifth Circuit, whether public officials ‘would turn a blind eye to torture.’ ” (citation omitted)). Because “affirmatively consent or acquiesce” connotes a higher degree of culpability than mere “acquiescence,” “awareness,” “willful blindness,” and “willful acceptance,” the BIA applied a higher legal standard to deny petitioners claim for CAT relief. See Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we remand to the BIA to reconsider petitioners claim for CAT relief under the appropriate standard.

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1

.   Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.

2

.   Though the BIA invoked Matter of A-B- in its decision, petitioners brief urges us to remand to the BIA for consideration of that case. At this point, the intervening authority that requires reconsideration is Diaz-Reynoso.